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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE
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INTRODUCTION OF EXCESSIVELY
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS OR SERVICES




On March 10, 2006, I testified before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary urging the enactment of legislation to im-
pose criminal liability on corporate executives who knowingly, or
with reckless disregard for life, introduce dangerously defective prod-
ucts or services into the stream of commerce. I In this article, as in my
testimony, I present and discuss the reasons why the existing system
of assigning liability for the intentional or reckless introduction into
the marketplace of excessively risky products and services solely to
the corporate entities is inefficient, and I propose a new solution.
While some products and services will inevitably injure or kill,
these injuries or deaths are not necessarily the product of wrongdo-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H.
Bowen School of Law. Former attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice. The
author thanks U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Brett Tolman,
Bruce Artim, Alex Dahl, Lisa Owings, Todd Braunstein, Matt McPhillips, Damion
Nielson, Stephanie Cook, and Jonathan Rosen. The author also thanks Professors
Pearl Steinbuch, Kenneth Gallant, Frances Fendler, and Zachary Kramer for their
meaningful contributions to this article, and Jamie Evans for her outstanding insight
and exceptional assistance in making this article a reality.
1. This article is a significant expansion of my testimony before the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties En-
sure Corporate Accountability? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 12-13, 76-80, 202-12 (2006) (statement of Robert Steinbuch), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1 792&witid=5130.
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ing. 2 Others, however, are the product of improper behavior. Legally,
the challenge has been to define acceptable risk and then to differenti-
ate it from intentional wrongdoing. So far, products liability law has
taken on this task. Products liability law has traditionally been used to
hold manufacturers and service providers civilly responsible for those
products and services that are unacceptably dangerous. However,
civil liability alone has been inadequate for discouraging the introduc-
tion of excessively dangerous goods and services into the marketplace.
The current tort system provides insufficient incentives to pre-
vent disreputable corporate executives from knowingly selling goods
and services that unreasonably risk injury or death. While private
causes of action offer the possibility of compensation to the improp-
erly injured or the estates of the wrongfully killed, they perform a poor
job of motivating corporate executives to take proper precautionary
measures in the first place. The tort system in this context thus be-
comes a cost-shifting scheme by which businesses unilaterally impose
injuries upon unwitting consumers for the economic benefit of the
business and, ultimately, corporate executives. This system allows ex-
ecutives to profit from the subsidized and delayed compensation of the
injured or killed members of the consuming public. While the busi-
ness entities may be held financially responsible in the future for harm
to the public (often after the responsible individual executives have
left the business entities), this cost is inevitably borne by unwitting
shareholders who have turned over control of their companies to risk-
imposing management. Thus, these industry executives capture sig-
nificant portions of the economic rents derived from the short-term
profits resulting from selling such goods or services without full inter-
nalization of the costs of production.
In Part II of this Article, I give concrete examples of intentional
or reckless industry wrongdoing causing injury and death that remains
undeterred under our current system of civil liability. In Part III I
analyze the underlying reasons for the insufficiency of the current le-
gal system to properly incentivize industry executives to avoid unnec-
essary risks to the public. I then offer a solution to resolve this critical
2. The law may impose strict liability for manufacturing defects "even if the plain-
tiff is unable to show that the manufacturer's quality control fails to meet risk-utility
norms." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB § 2 cmt. a (1998). Such no-
fault strict liability is generally thought to advance several objectives. For one,
"[s]ome courts and commentators [I have said that strict liability discourages the con-
sumption of defective products by causing the purchase price of products to reflect,
more than would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects. And by eliminating the
issue of manufacturer fault from plaintiff's case, strict liability reduces the transaction
costs involved in litigating that issue." Id.
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problem: by forcing individually responsible industry executives to
directly internalize the cost of harm resulting from the intentional or
reckless introduction of dangerously defective products or services
into the stream of commerce through the imposition of criminal penal-
ties (the Executive-Internalization Approach). I support this proposi-
tion in Part IV by comparing the Executive-Internalization Approach
to similar domestic and international schemes, which addresses the
misplaced concern that criminalizing industry executive behavior is a
significant departure from the current legal landscape.
II.
EXAMPLES OF INDUSTRY EXECUTIVES WHO KNOWINGLY
SELL DANGEROUS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
A. Medical Products and Services
Virtually all medical products and services pose some inherent
risk of injury or death for patients, though most of those risks are
infinitesimally small. In regulating these goods and services through
the legal system, society strives to ensure that the risks to patients are
low, but, understandably, not non-existent. 3 Too often, however,
manufacturers and service providers knowingly provide goods and
services that fall outside accepted norms of safety.4
1. Untreated HIV-Infected Blood Products
In 1982, a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) memorandum
to manufacturers of blood products warned that "[a]lthough the cause
of the outbreak is unknown, the information suggest[s] that a transmis-
3. For instance, most prescription drugs have potentially harmful side effects but
courts rarely, if ever, impose liability for defective design of such drugs as long as the
net benefit outweighs any possible harm since all medications entail some risk. See
id. at § 6(c) & cmt. a.
4. For example, individuals in the midst of heart attacks are deceptively and inten-
tionally lured into out-dated, sub-standard medical facilities by business executives in
order to maximize their income at the expense of these patients' lives. See Robert
Steinbuch, Preventing Under-Equipped Medical Facilities from Killing Heart-Attack
Patients: Correcting Inefficiencies in the Current Regulatory Paradigm for Providing
Critical Health-Care Services to Patients with Acute Coronary Syndrome, 17 CASE
W. RES. HEALTH MATRIX: J. oF L. AND MED. (forthcoming 2007). "Community hos-
pitals" without angioplasty facilities to treat heart attacks, nonetheless, self-advertise
as having "Chest-Pain Emergency Rooms" or "Chest Pain Centers" when there are
often fully-equipped hospitals and heart centers nearby. These community hospitals
undertake this often deceptive advertising because they want the lucrative business of
the patients that walk into hospitals with potential heart attacks, notwithstanding that
they are unable to provide the best treatment.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2007]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
sible agent might be involved and concern about transmission through
blood and blood products has been raised."' 5 Nonetheless, few blood
banks conducted "surrogate" HIV testing, a method for detecting a
hepatitis antigen or other abnormalities that are found in most HIV-
positive donors. 6 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) warned
blood bankers that blood products "appear responsible for AIDS
among hemophilia patients" and that AIDS posed a real threat to re-
cipients of blood and blood products. 7 The CDC outlined simple mea-
sures that should have been taken to prevent further spread. 8 But the
leaders of the blood banking industry ignored these warnings and did
not implement prevention measures. Instead, they told the American
public that the blood was safe and sold the HIV-infected blood.
For example, in January 1983, the Manager of Plasma Procure-
ment at Cutter Biological Laboratories (a blood products manufac-
turer) acknowledged in a letter that "[t]here is strong evidence to
suggest that AIDS is passed on to other people through . . . plasma
products." 9 Even earlier, Cutter recognized the potential for danger in
its products. Its in-house counsel warned in 1982 that although there
was little proof of a relationship between its products and AIDS, "liti-
gation is inevitable, and we must demonstrate diligence in passing
along whatever we do know to the physicians who prescribe the prod-
uct."10 Nonetheless, Cutter did not include a warning with its product
for another year.11 Similarly, Thomas Drees, president of Alpha Ther-
apeutic, said that he believed then that the company's blood products
5. Deborah Tedford, Hemophiliacs Clash with Drug Companies; Suit: Firms Lax
With AIDS Tests in '80s, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1; see also, Richard J.
Newman, How Tainted Blood is Killing Hemophiliacs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
June 27, 1994, at 76 ("The available evidence strongly suggests that AIDS is trans-
missible via AHF [antihemophilic factor]," according to a 1983 internal Red Cross
MEMO.).
6. Newman, supra note 5, at 76.
7. Walt Bogdanich & Eric Koli, 2 Paths of Bayer Drug in 80's: Riskier One
Steered Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at Al.
8. INST. OF MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY: AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECI-
SIONMAKING 101-06 (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.,
Nat'l Acad. Press) (1995), http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=4989&page
=RI (describing how, in 1983, the CDC recommended questioning blood donors
about their sexual history to help identify higher-risk donors with multiple partners
and suggested performing "surrogate testing" for AIDS, an analysis that detects a
certain group of agents, such as antibodies to the hepatitis B core antigen, that are
often associated with the AIDS virus.).
9. Bogdanich & Koli, supra note 7, at Al.
10. Elizabeth Kastor, Blood Feud: Hemophiliacs & AIDS, WASH. POST, May 10,
1993, at BI.
11. Id.
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were dangerous.' 2 However, "though [Alpha] should have immedi-
ately recalled the possibly infected factor concentrate, the only actions
Alpha took initially to deal with the matter were to increase its insur-
ance coverage and institute a donor self-exclusion program."1 3 Alpha
and other companies continued to export leftover HIV-infected blood
products from inventory for over a year after making safer versions of
the blood products available domestically.' 4 As a result of the blood
bankers' inaction, during the 1980s, more than ten thousand
hemophiliacs and over twelve thousand other blood transfusion recipi-
ents were infected with the deadly HIV virus. 15
In 1998, a class of nearly six thousand hemophiliacs and their
beneficiaries received a settlement of $600 million for their
injuries.' 6 Chief Judge Richard Posner affirmed a consent decree
requiring that each of the four accused pharmaceutical companies
pay a percentage of the settlement amount approximating its
market share of blood products.17 To this day, the companies admit
12. AIDS-Blood Allegation, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 20, 1992, at 16.
13. Cross v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., No. 94-382, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804 at
*22-23 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2000).
14. See Bogdanich & Koli, supra note 7, at Al. Records indicate even a year after
receiving approval to sell safer, heated blood products, Cutter Biological, a division of
Bayer, exported more than 100,000 vials of unheated blood products, valued in excess
of $4 million. Id. An internal memo stated that "[wie want to give the impression
that we are continuously improving our product without telling them we expect soon
to also have a heat-treated" version. Id. Executives from the three other American-
based companies-Armour Pharmaceutical, Baxter International, and Alpha Thera-
peutic-likewise continued to sell the unsafe concentrate. Id.
15. See Michael McLeod, Bad Blood: Every Day, a Hemophiliac Dies of AIDS,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 1993, at 10 (noting that in early 1980s, more than ten
thousand hemophiliacs in the United States were infected with HIV due to a blood-
based clotting agent that pharmaceutical companies and the National Hemophilia
Foundation encouraged continued use of, even after federal agencies had issued warn-
ings of its danger); JUSTICE HORACE KREVER, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE
BLOOD SYSTEM IN CANADA 738 (1997), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/
301/hcan-scan/commission-bloodfinalrep-e/vol3-e.pdf (noting that more than
twelve thousand blood transfusion patients were infected with HIV during the 1980s).
16. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016,
1017-18 (7th Cir. 1998).
17. See id. The four defendant companies were Alpha Therapeutic Corporation,
which paid 15% of the settlement, Armour Pharmaceutical Company and Baxter
Healthcare Corporation, which both contributed 20%, and Bayer Corporation, which
paid 45%. See Blood Product Firms to Pay Government $12 Million to Settle Health
Care Claims, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 19 at 712 (May 8, 1997); DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE
GAIN 306-07 (2000) (citing Factor Concentrate Litigation Settlement Agreement
(Aug. 13, 1996) at 7), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR
969/MR969.ch 11 .pdf).
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no wrongdoing, as the settlement agreement released them from
liability. 18
2. Guidant Defibrillators
Guidant is one of the nation's leading heart defibrillator manufac-
turers. 19 An implantable defibrillator is a device used to monitor the
heartbeat and administer an electric shock to the heart when needed to
reestablish a normal beat rhythm. 20 Guidant produced a defibrillator
with a serious defect-when the patient with the implanted defibril-
lator needed the "shock" produced by the unit, the device occasionally
short circuited, in which case the patient typically died.21 Recently,
the company acknowledged that it waited three years before notifying
the public that some of its defibrillators had this deadly electrical sys-
tem defect.22 Certain company executives were aware of the risks to
patients as early as 2002.23 Indeed, although Guidant manufactured
18. See Liz Doup, Infected at 14, Forgotten at 31; Hemophiliacs Worldwide Inher-
ited AIDS Via a Tainted Blood Product, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec.
28, 2003, at Al (responding to allegations, Bayer issued a statement that said the
company "has always behaved responsibly, ethically and humanely to provide lifesav-
ing products for the global hemophilia community.").
19. See Barry Meier, Heart Device Sold Despite Flaw, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2005, at C 1; see also News Release, Boston Scientific, Boston Scientific Com-
pletes Combination with Guidant (Apr. 21, 2006), http://bostonscientific.mediaroom.
com/index.php?s=press releases&item=513; News Release, Boston Scientific, Boston
Scientific Comments on Guidant's Announcement (Dec. 7, 2005), http://bostonscien-
tific.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=pressreleases&item=470; David Phelps, Directors
Under the Gun in Guidant Duel; Pressure from Shareholders Probably Has Many of
the Players Reaching for Antacids, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 19, 2006,
at D1; Val Brickates Kennedy, Boston Scientific Goes After Guidant,
MARKETWATCH, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/guidant-
gets-25b-offer-boston/story.aspx?guid=%7B7F1 C893A%2D5DA6%2D467F%2DAC
1D%2D84657FBF7956%7D.
20. See AM. HEART ASS'N, WHAT IS AN IMPLANTABLE DEFIBRILLATOR? (2004),
http://www.americanheart.org/downloadable/heart/1 10081064047842%20Whatlsan
ImplantableDefib.pdf.
21. See Barry Meier, Internal Turmoil at Device Maker as Inquiry Grew, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A l (stating that "at least seven patients have died in connec-
tion with short circuits in three models of Guidant defibrillators"); Thomas M. Burton
& Anna Wilde Mathews, Guidant Sold Heart Device After Discovering Flaw, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 2005, at D3 (noting that Guidant contended the short circuit malfunc-
tion was extremely rare).
22. See Barry Meier, Guidant Case May Involve Crime Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2005 at Cl; FDA: Implanted Defibrillator Defects On the Rise, MSNBC.coM,
Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9367708/ (Guidant has acknowledged
that it waited three years before warning doctors and roughly 24,000 patients about an
electrical system defect in its heart defibrillators).
23. See Barry Meier, Files Show Guidant Foresaw Some Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2005, at Cl; Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate Ac-
countability? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 134-35
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and distributed an improved version, it never informed the FDA of the
defect ,4 it continued selling the defective products out of inventory,
and it never warned thousands of patients and doctors about the risks
of malfunction. 25 Guidant says it did not report the defibrillator de-
sign changes because it decided that FDA regulations did not require
the reporting of "manufacturing enhancements. '2 6
There have been at least sixty-seven clinical failures of Guidant's
Prizm 2 DR and Renewal defibrillators reported, resulting in seven
deaths worldwide. 27 The first case of about forty-five products liabil-
ity class actions and fifty individual lawsuits filed in state and federal
courts against the company regarding Guidant's defective heart
defibrillators began in February of 2006.28
3. Intrauterine Contraceptives
A.H. Robins Company (Robins) manufactured an intrauterine
contraceptive called the Dalkon Shield.29 Intrauterine devices (IUDs)
are contraceptives that are inserted into the uterus by a clinician. 30 A
string attached to the bottom of the IUD extends "out of the uterus,
(statement of Barry Maron, Director, Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Center, Minneap-
olis Heart Institute Foundation), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm
?id= 1 792&witid=5122.
24. See Meier, supra note 22, at Cl (noting that in response to an earlier inquiry,
Guidant said it had decided not to report the defect to the FDA). But cf Burton &
Mathews, supra note 21, at D3 (claiming Guidant notified FDA about the defect in
2002).
25. Barry Meier, Guidant Agrees to Pay for Defibrillator Replacements, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2005, at C2 (stating that Guidant first realized electrical problems
with their defibrillators in early 2002 and manufactured an improved version cor-
recting the problem but continued to sell older, defective defibrillators out of inven-
tory and did not tell doctors or hospitals that an improved version was available).
26. Meier, supra note 19, at C1. For the applicable FDA regulations, see 21 C.F.R.
§ 806.1(b)(1) (2006) (exempting actions taken by manufacturers to improve "per-
formance or quality" of a device from required reporting of "certain actions concern-
ing device corrections and removals" when these actions "do not reduce a risk to
health posed by the device") and § 806. 10(a)( 1) (requiring manufacturers to submit a
written report to the FDA of any correction initiated "to reduce a risk to health posed
by [a] device").
27. Nora L. Tooher, Litigation Mounts Over Guidant Corp. 's Flawed Heart De-
vices, ST. Louis DAILY REC./ST. Louis COUNTIAN, Feb. 2, 2006, at 1 (stating that
Renewal had thirty-five failures and five deaths, and Prizm had thirty-two failures and
two deaths).
28. See id.
29. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Kan. 1987) (describing
factual background suit against Robins for personal injuries allegedly arising from the
use of the "Dalkon Shield").
30. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 487 (27th ed. 2000); Russell Mokhiber,
Criminals by Any Other Name; Corporate Executives, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at
40, 43.
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through the cervix, into the vagina where bacteria are present." 3' The
Dalkon Shield became problematic because in its case, "bacteria in the
vagina would not only rest on the string but would move into it, and
then move (or 'wick') inside the string, up into the germ-free uterus,
causing pelvic infection. '32
Internal memoranda show that Robins knew about the danger
posed by the tail string. 33 A 1975 internal Robins memorandum cites
248 cases of Dalkon Shield users having infection-induced miscar-
riages compared to the fifty-five cases for all other IUD users. 34 Rob-
ert Nickless, a former product management coordinator for Robins,
advised in a company memorandum written two weeks after Robins
had acquired the right to manufacture the IUD, "the string or tail situa-
tion needs careful review since the present tail is reported (by a co-
inventor) to have a wicking tendency" to draw bacteria into the sterile
uterus.
35
Nevertheless, Robins went on to sell the product. Even after tak-
ing the product off the market, the company advised patients that they
did not need to remove the device.36 Not until six years later did the
company reverse this position and advise the public that the continued
use of the product was dangerous. 37
In all, the Dalkon Shield killed at least seventeen women and
caused injuries in over two hundred thousand more. 38 One woman
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See Allen v. A.H. Robins Co., 752 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. Subrata N. Chakravarty, Tunnel Vision, FORBES, May 21, 1984, at 214.
35. Barry Siegel, The Right Question; One Man's Effort to Tell Dalkon Story, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at 1.
36. See Allen, 752 F.2d at 1368 (noting that Robins removed the Dalkon Shield
from the market in June 1974 while at the same time stressing in a June 28 press
release that there is "no reason to believe at this time that physicians should remove
the Dalkon Shields from patients now wearing [them]"; one year later in an August
1975 press release, the company again reassured consumers, saying, "A.H. Robins
remains firm in its belief that the Dalkon Shield, when properly used, is a safe and
effective IUD."); Jury Gives Woman $9.2 Million in Birth Control Device Suit, CHI.
TRIB., May 4, 1985, at 3 (reporting that Robins removed the Dalkon Shield from
market in 1974 but did not advise women to have it removed until 1980); Tetuan, 738
P.2d at 1221 (stating that after halting domestic sales of the Shield in 1974, Robins
continued distributing it overseas).
37. Morton Mintz, Isolated Cases Set Off the Alarms About IUD, WASH. POST,
Apr. 9, 1985, at Al (reporting that on September 25, 1980, Robins sent out a "Dear
Doctor" letter urging all women who were still wearing the Shield to have it removed;
the reason given for this advice, however, was that any IUD left inside the body for
this length of time posed serious health risks to the woman and not that the Dalkon
Shield presented any unique hazards).
38. Gina Kolata, The Sad Legacy of the Dalkon Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1987,
at A120 (two hundred thousand women sued the A. H. Robins Company for injuries
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using the Dalkon Shield IUD was forced to undergo a total abdominal
hysterectomy at the age of twenty-eight for the removal of damaged
tissue caused by her implanted Dalkon Shield IUD. 39 Because Robins
withheld from the public relevant information regarding the Shield's
dangerous side effects, the woman's doctor initially prescribed antibi-
otics for the infection and not the Shield's removal.40 The Kansas
Supreme Court found "substantial evidence to conclude that Robins
deliberately, intentionally, and actively concealed the dangers of the
Shield... until those dangers worked their tragic results on [the plain-
tiff]. We find that the [$7.5 million] punitive damages award is not
excessive nor does it shock the collective conscience of this court."'4 '
In another case, two special masters in the U.S. District Court in
Minnesota held that Robins had "engaged in an ongoing fraud by
knowingly misrepresenting the nature, quality, safety and efficacy" of
the Dalkon Shield.42 The Minnesota District Court overseeing twenty
consolidated cases concerning settlement agreements between Robins
and Shield users reprimanded three Robins executives: President and
CEO E. Claiborne Robins, Jr., General Counsel William A. Forrest,
and Senior Vice President of Research and Development Dr. Carl D.
Lunsford.4 3 Judge Miles Lord reprimanded these men for knowingly
allegedly caused by the Dalkon Shield); Associated Press, Court OKs $2.5-Billion
Fund to Cover Robins' Dalkon Shield Claims, L.A. TIMES, at A3 (a court-approved
bankruptcy reorganization plan for the A. H. Robins Co. created a $2.5-billion trust
fund to compensate the roughly two hundred thousand women with injury claims
against the company).
39. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1216.
40. Id. at 1227.
41. Id. at 1240.
42. Martha Middleton, Dalkon Makers Cited for "Ongoing Fraud," NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 11, 1985, at 8 (quoting Special Masters Thomas Bartsh and Peter Thompson in a
Feb. 21, 1985 pretrial discovery hearing for three consolidated Dalkon Shield cases
brought before U.S. District Judge Robert G. Renner).
43. Judge Miles Lord delivered this reprimand in Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Civil Nos. 84-5061-MN; 84-5062-MN:
Gentlemen, the result of these activities and attitudes on your part have
been catastrophic. Today as you sit here attempting once more to extri-
cate yourselves from the legal consequences of your acts, none of you
have ... faced up to the fact that more than 9,000 women have made
claims that they gave a part of their womanhood so that your company
might prosper. It is alleged that others gave their lives so you might
prosper. And there stand behind legions more who have been injured but
who have not sought relief in the courts of this land . . . If one poor
young man were by some act of his, without authority or consent, to
inflict such damage upon one woman, he would be jailed for a good por-
tion for the rest of his life. And yet your company, without warning to
women, invaded their bodies by the millions and caused them injuries by
the thousands. And when the time came for these women to make their
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continuing to allow the victims to use a deadly product: "The only
conceivable reasons you have not recalled this product are that it
would hurt your balance sheet and alert women, who already have
been harmed, that you may be liable for their injuries. ' 44
Furthermore, the executives tried to deny any knowledge of the
danger.45 But Roger Tuttle, a former staff lawyer for the company,
testified that he saved from destruction what may have been hundreds
of documents that were "'legally damaging'" to the company's inac-
curate assertions that corporate executives had no knowledge of the
Dalkon Shield defects.46
claims against your company, you attacked their characters, you inquired
into their sexual practices and into the identity of their sex partners. You
exposed these women and ruined families and reputations and careers in
order to intimidate those who would raise their voices against you. You
introduced issues that had no relationship whatsoever to the fact that you
planted in the bodies of these women instruments of death, mutilation,
and of disease ..... The company has not suffered, nor have you men
personally. You are collectively being enriched by millions of dollars
each year. There is as yet no evidence that your company has suffered
any penalty whatsoever for these litigations. In fact the evidence is to the
contrary. The case law indicates that the purpose of punitive damages is
to make an award which will punish a defendant for his wrongdoing.
Punishment traditionally involves the principles of revenge, rehabilitation
and deterrence. There is no evidence I have been able to find, in my
review of these cases, to indicate that any one of these factors has been
accomplished ..... I see little in the history of this case that would deter
others from partaking of like acts. The policy of delay and obfuscation
practiced by your lawyers in courts throughout this country has made it
possible for your insurance company and you .. to delay the payment of
these claims for such a long period that the interest you earn in the in-
terim covers the costs of these cases. You in essence.., pay nothing out
of your pocket to settle these cases. What other corporate officials any-
where could possibly learn a lesson from this? The only lesson could be
that it pays to delay compensating victims, and to intimidate, harass and
shame your victims, the injured parties.
Miles W. Lord, The Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimand by Chief
Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 7, 7-11 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit later ruled this reprimand to be a violation of
A.H. Robins' due process and had it stricken from the record. Gardiner v. A.H. Rob-
ins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
44. Lord, supra note 43, at 10.
45. See Austin C. Wehrwein, Were Dalkon Documents Destroyed?, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 13, 1984, at 3.
46. Id.
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4. Automobiles-the "Dangerous Type" 47
Automobiles carry inherent dangers, and so-called luxury cars
often carry safety features that economy cars do not. 48 However, there
are minimum safety features established by industry practice that re-
flect readily-available contemporary technologies. 49  Intentional
downward departures from these standards highlight a disregard for
the public's well-being and are subject to sanction. 50
The 1975 Ford Mustang was saddled with a fuel system integrity
problem known to Ford when it put the car on the market.51 Accord-
ing to former National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA) official Joan Claybrook, "Ford knew and never told the De-
partment of Transportation during the course of [a 1976 NHTSA] in-
vestigation that when the car was hit in the rear and the fuel tank came
forward, fuel could spew out into the passenger compartment," in-
creasing the risk of passenger injury or death from fire.52
47. THE CARS, Dangerous Type, on CANDY-O (Elektra Records 1990) (1979).
48. See, e.g., Volvo XC90: Celebrate Yourself, http://www.volvocars.us/models/xc
90/default.htm (follow "Safety" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 1, 2006) (explaining in
Volvo advertisement advanced safety features). For example, compare Insurance In-
stitute for Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Institute, http://www.iihs.org/ratings/
summary.aspx?class=10 (last visited Feb. 14, 2007) (reporting crashworthiness for
2007 models of large luxury cars and the standard nature of side airbags), with Insur-
ance Institute for Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Institute, http://www.iihs.org/
ratings/summary.aspx?class=20 (last visited Feb. 14, 2007) (reporting crashworthi-
ness for 2007 models of large family cars and the optional nature of side airbags).
49. See, 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2007) (showing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSSs), to which manufacturers of motor vehicles must conform and certify
compliance).
50. See 49 C.F.R. § 578.6 (2007) (stating that a person who violates specified pro-
visions or regulation prescribed under Title 49 of the United States Code "is liable to
the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than $6,000 for each
violation. A separate violation occurs for each motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
equipment and for each failure or refusal to allow or perform an act required by any of
those sections. The maximum civil penalty . . . for a related series of violations is
$16,375,000.").
51. See Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 476, 481 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984) (noting knowledge within Ford Motor Company as early as 1968 that design
and location of fuel tank installed in 1975 Mustang would cause tank to jam into rear
axle if struck from behind and upholding $8 million punitive damage award); CBS 60
Minutes IH Hosted by Dan Rather, A Classic Cover-Up?; Classic Ford Mustangs Pre-
sent Safety Hazard Due to Location of Fuel Tank, But Ford Denies Any Problem
(CBS television broadcast Aug. 17, 1999) [hereinafter A Classic Cover-Up?] (report-
ing that Ford was warned in 1968 by one of its engineers as well as its own Ford Test
301 that rear-end collision to Ford Mustang would cause gasoline to come into car).
52. A Classic Cover-Up? supra note 53; see also Linda Fantin, Sitting Target, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (Utah), July 28, 2003, at Al ("'The fundamental principle of crash fire
safety is that if you survive the trauma of a crash, you should not die by fire,' [Center
for Auto Safety] executive director Clarence M. Ditlow wrote in a letter to Ford.").
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Ford conducted a crash test 53 for other purposes in 1966 that it
"withheld from the Department of Transportation," which included a
video camera looking down into the Mustang's trunk that revealed
gasoline spewing into the passenger compartment whenever the fuel
tank was crushed upon rear impact.54 Later that year, Ford conducted
a crash test on a modified version of the Mustang in order to deter-
mine if the car met federal rear-end crash standards. 55 The frame of
this modified version was strengthened in a way making the gas tank
less likely to rupture during a rear-end collision.56 Ford reported pass-
ing results of this test to the federal government even though Mus-
tangs with the modified frame were never manufactured. 57
When the NHTSA investigated Ford's "drop-in" fuel tank, Ford
did not disclose the results of the original crash test or the fact that the
Mustang's frame had been altered when performing this second crash
test.58 Unaware of these test results, however, the NHTSA, which has
to approve cars for the market,59 mistakenly concluded that classic
Mustang fuel tanks "present[ed] no fire hazard which does not also
exist in other fuel tank systems."'60
Certain Ford executives had actual knowledge of an increased
chance that the design of the car could cause an explosion on rear
impact.61 A report from a member of Ford's Safety Engineering staff
stated that "the drop-in gas tank [was] undesirable because a fuel tank
53. During a motor vehicle crash test, the vehicle is subjected to extreme conditions
in order to determine under which of those conditions the vehicle will fail. See gener-
ally Bengt Halvorson, A Crash Course in Crash-Test Ratings, FORBES AUTOS, June
23, 2006, available at http://www.forbesautos.com/advice/safety/crash-test/O l-under-
standing.html (describing crash agencies and tests).
54. See A Classic Cover-Up?, supra note 51.
55. Baier v. Ford Motor Co., No. C04-2039, 2005 WL 928615, at *1 (N.D. Iowa
Apr. 21, 2005).
56. Id.
57. Id. at *1-2.
58. See id.; A Classic Cover-Up?, supra note 51.
59. See generally Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2000).
The National Highway Transportation Safety Authority, or NHTSA, regulates the safe
condition and operation of motor vehicles sold to the public. See About NHTSA,
http://www.nhtsa.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). In doing so, it is required under the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)
and Regulations to which motor vehicle manufacturers must certify compliance and
affix a label to each vehicle stating that the vehicle conforms to the applicable
FMVSSs. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30111, 30112, 30115.
60. See A Classic Cover-Up?, supra note 51.
61. See Baier, 2005 WL 928615, at *5. In fact, the death rate in rear-end
1964-1970 model Classic Mustangs collisions where fire occurred was more than
three times higher than the same death rate for all other cars of the same period. See A
Classic Cover-Up?, supra note 51.
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rupture could lead to gasoline getting into the car and, therefore, that
the tank should be relocated or a barrier installed. '62 In addition, ac-
cording to evidence produced in one case, "minutes [from] a Septem-
ber 12, 1967, meeting indicate that Ford knew the drop-in gas tank
was more likely to burst than were the Chevrolet fuel tanks."'63
Internal Ford memoranda recommended deferral of safety equip-
ment in order to decrease manufacturing costs. One memorandum es-
timated that "'the total financial effect of the Fuel System Integrity
program [would] reduce Company profits over the 1973-1976 cycle
by $109 million,' and recommended that Ford 'defer adoption of the
[fuel-system safety measures] on all affected cars until 1976 to realize
a design cost savings of $20.9 million compared to 1974.' ",64 An esti-
mated two hundred people burned to death as a result of the Mus-
tang's exploding fuel tank.65
In Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, the parents of fifteen-year old
Terri Stubblefield brought a wrongful death suit against Ford Motor
Company for negligent design of the 1975 Ford Mustang 11.66 Their
daughter, who was riding in the back seat of a Mustang II, was fatally
burned when the car was struck from behind by another car while
stopped in traffic. 67 A Georgia Appeals Court held that:
Ford was shown to have actual knowledge before [selling the car]
of a defect in its product from which it could have reasonably fore-
seen injury of the specific type sustained here .... Ford's own
documents disclosed its knowledge that if certain automobiles were
struck from the rear they would burn, with a strong probability of
resulting in injury to the occupants; nevertheless, Ford management
decided not to correct this defect or warn the owners of the danger
created thereby. The evidence further authorized [the jury's] find-
62. Baier, 2005 WL 928615, at *5.
63. Id.
64. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). An-
other company directive concerning implementation of safety measures revealed that
"actual hardware will not be added until required by law." Id. at 476. Additionally,
CBS 60 Minutes II reported that Lee Iacocca, former president of Ford Motor Com-
pany, was recorded on President Nixon's secret taping system talking about Ford's
safety standards, saying: "Shoulder harnesses and head rests are complete wastes of
money. Safety has really killed off our business." A Classic Cover-Up?, supra note
51; see also Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good is Served by the Remedy of
Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793, 826 (1997).
65. See Safety Forum: Product Safety News and Resources, Mustang: Ford's
Firebomb, Sept. 30, 2002, http://www.safetyforum.com/fordmustang/. More than
seventy families of those who have burned to death in a Classic Mustang rear-end
collision between 1964 and 1974 have sued Ford. Id.
66. 319 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
67. Id. at 474.
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ing that Ford weighed the costs of corrective action against the ben-
efits of profits and deliberately decided to market the 1975
Mustang II with clear knowledge of the danger .... [E]vidence...
that Ford had actual knowledge before the sale of the automobile of
a condition presenting a danger to users ... authorized the jury to
find that Ford acted in bad faith in placing such a vehicle in the
channels of commerce. 68
As a result, Judge Sognier held that "[t]he evidence here was suf-
ficient to authorize the jury to find that the sum of $8 million was...
necessary to deter Ford from repeating its conduct; that is, its con-
scious decisions to defer implementation of safety devices in order to
protect its profits."'69
General Motors (GM) also faced problems with dangerously lo-
cated fuel tanks. Between 1973 and 1987, GM manufactured nearly
ten million pickup trucks with "side-saddle" fuel tanks that were
mounted outside the main frame rail. 70 This design made the truck
more likely to explode upon impact, and was reported to have resulted
in at least 800 fire-related deaths.
7 1
Internal documents demonstrate that GM executives contem-
plated the risk of products liability suits, but still chose not to change
the design. 72 GM's own comparative accident study showed "the
1973 trucks had more fuel leaks from the fuel tank than did the pre-
1973 pick-ups."'7 3 In fact, former Secretary of Transportation Fede-
rico Pena noted that "GM was aware, possibly as early as the mid-
1970s, but certainly by the early 1980s[,] that [the "side saddle" tank]
68. Id. at 482.
69. Id. at 481.
70. See Jeffrey Brodeur, Appeals Court Rejects GM Pickup Settlement, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at 3; Jacqueline Gaulin, U.S., GM Strike Deal on Trucks; Pena
Drops Effort to Recall Pickups, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at Al.
71. See Myron Levin, A History of Fiery Deaths on the Road; Facing Lawsuits,
GM Moved Gas Tanks of its C/K Pickups Inside the Frame. But it Denies the Design
Was Unsafe, and Federal Regulators Retreated From a Costly Recall, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2001, at Al. The "dual side-saddle" fuel tank design has resulted in more
than eight hundred deaths and, according to head of the Center for Auto Safety, Clar-
ence Ditlow, doubles the risk for impact disaster. Id. See also Testimony on Need to
Recall GM's Rolling Firebombs Before the S. Labor & Human Res. Comm., 103rd
Cong. (1994), 1994 WL 684086 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of Clarence M. Ditlow, Execu-
tive Director, Center for Auto Safety) [hereinafter "Ditlow statement"].
72. See Andrew Pollack, Paper Trail Haunts G.M. After it Loses Injury Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1999, at A12. Internal memos revealed that as early as 1973, GM
began balancing the costs of making its fuel system safer with the costs of lawsuits
involving fuel-fed fires. Id. GM continued the "side-saddle" tanks until after 1988,
after which they abandoned the design mostly in response to mounting lawsuits. See
Levin, supra note 71, at Al.
73. See Ditlow statement, supra note 71.
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design made [their] trucks more vulnerable, and that fatalities from
side-impact fires were occurring. However, GM chose not to alter the
design for 15 years." 74
In General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, the parents of Shannon
Moseley sued GM for their son's wrongful death.75 Moseley was fa-
tally burned in his 1985 GMC pickup truck when it burst into flames
after being struck on the driver's side by another pickup truck. 76 The
Georgia Court of Appeals held that there was evidence that GM knew
of the dangers involved with the placement of the fuel tanks, but did
not modify the design "because of economic considerations. '77 The
court relied on GM's willingness to endanger its consumers for eco-
nomic benefit to support an award of punitive damages for over $100
million.78
The 1979 Chevrolet Malibu also had a fuel tank integrity prob-
lem; this car was constructed with a rear fuel tank located only eleven
inches from the bumper.79 Despite thousands of vehicle fires, and
hundreds of injuries and deaths that resulted from this design,80 GM
did not address the problem with the Malibu until it faced a lawsuit in
1994. The litigation revealed internal memoranda establishing that
GM knew of the danger of fuel tank fires upon rear impact, but chose
not to modify its design before putting the vehicle on the market be-
cause it did not deem the costs of doing so to be worth the correspond-
ing consumer safety benefit. 8' In particular, a memorandum written in
74. Pat Etheridge, U.S. DOT Says GM Must Recall Thousands of Pick-Ups (CNN
television broadcast Oct. 17, 1994). The testimony of Clarence Ditlow indicates that
GM's priority was installing a larger gas tank to use as a selling point. See Ditlow
statement, supra note 71.
75. 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
76. Id. at 305.
77. Id. at 311.
78. Id. at 311-12. The court's decision was later abrogated on different grounds.
See Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998).
79. See Milo Geyelin, Lasting Impact: How an Internal Memo Written 26 Years
Ago is Costing GM Dearly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at Al. Placing the fuel tank
11 inches away from the rear bumper was cheaper than placing the tank 20 inches
from the bumper, the customary distance for previous models. See id.
80. Automotive Editors and Legal Writers, Greene, Broillet, Taylor, Wheeler &
Panish Say GM Continues to Misplace Blame for Exploding Fuel Tanks, Bus. WIRE,
Aug. 9, 1999, at Business (quoting Brian Panish, Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs in
Anderson v. General Motors, who claimed that GM, by its reluctance to redesign the
Malibu's fuel tank placement, "wrote off between 300 and 500 lives a year and al-
lowed thousands more to suffer ghastly bum injuries.").
81. See Anderson v. General Motors Corp., No. BC-116926 (Sup. Ct. L.A. County
Aug. 26, 1999), cited in Lori Woodward O'Connell, The Case for Continuing to
Award Punitive Damages, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 873, 874-5 (2001). The lawsuit re-
sulted in a $1.09 billion verdict against GM, reduced from the original $4.9 billion
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2007]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
1973 by an engineer at GM, Edward Ivey, estimated that "fatalities
related to accidents with fuel fed fires are costing General Motors
$2.40 per automobile in current operation,' ' 82 which is "less than the
$8.59 it would cost to use the safer over axle design. '83 GM estimated
that five hundred fatalities would occur every year as a result of post-
collision fuel tank fires.84 In Anderson v. General Motors Corp., the
court found "clear and convincing evidence ... that defendants' fuel
tank was placed behind the axle on automobiles of the make and
model involved here, in order to maximize profits, to the disregard of
public safety."'85
5. Zylon Vests
In 2003, the Second Chance Body Armor Company publicly ac-
knowledged that its Zylon bulletproof vests deteriorated rapidly, de-
creasing their effectiveness over time.86 The company, however,
knew as early as 1998 that the Zylon material had failed company
verdict. Margaret Fisk, The Biggest Jury Verdict of 1999, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 28, 2000,
at Al. The jurors in Anderson concluded from an internal GM memo that GM made a
decision to pay projected damage awards of $2.40 per vehicle rather than pay $8.59
per vehicle to move the Malibu fuel tank over the rear axle. See Jeffrey Ball & Milo
Geyelin, GM Ordered by Jury to Pay $4.9 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1999, at A3.
82. The "Ivey Memo," CNN.coM, Sept. 10, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/US/9909/
10/ivey.memo/.
83. Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate Accountability?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 154 (2006) (statement of
Brian Panish, Partner, Panish, Shea & Boyle, LLP); see also David Zeman and Janet
L. Fix, When Secrecy Explodes (Part 1) GM and Fuel-Tank Fires, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Jan. 7, 2000, at IA.
84. The "Ivey Memo," supra note 82. See also Greene, Broillet, Taylor, Wheeler
& Panish Say GM Continues to Misplace Blame for Exploding Fuel Tanks, Bus.
WIRE, Aug. 9, 1999, at 1 (attorney statement alleging that GM's rear-mounted fuel
tank design has caused hundreds of Americans to burn to death); Robert Sherefkin,
Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A Fiery Failure, 77 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS 208 (2003) (an esti-
mated 500 deaths and hundreds of injuries have been linked to rear-mounted fuel tank
design in the Ford Pinto).
85. Fisk, supra note 81, at Al.
86. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Zylon Body Armor Fails to Protect & Serve Police,
Lawsuits Claim, 41 TRIAL 14, 18 (2005) (quoting a 2003 press release that admitted
"more severe Zylon degradation problems over time and use than previously dis-
closed"). L. Anne Newell, Arizona Law Enforcement Wearing Potentially Unsafe
Bulletproof Vests, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 30, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.
accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-7544464_ITM (subscription required)
(reporting that "Second Chance Body Armor .. . sent warning letters to tens of
thousands of customers across the country .... The letters said a synthetic fiber used
in the vests might be deteriorating as it ages and, although tests are inconclusive so
far, the vests have been discontinued. 'We tested more than 200 vests in the last two
years, and the most recent set of tests yielded results that caused us to be concerned,'
said company spokesman Gregg Smith.").
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quality tests. That year, Second Chance was informed in writing by
Japanese Zylon manufacturer Toyobo of its own tests indicating the
fabric lost twenty percent of its durability over a two hundred-hour
period of light exposure. 87 One complaint alleged that in 2000, inter-
nal testing conducted by Toyobo revealed that the Zylon material
"suffered from severe and accelerated degradation when exposed to
light, heat and humidity." 88 By 2001, Second Chance research direc-
tor Aaron Westrick advised Zylon executives in a company memoran-
dum to "immediately notify our customers of the degradation
problems we are experiencing [with Zylon vests] ... Second Chance
should make the right, [sic] difficult decisions regarding this issue.
Lives and our credibility are at stake."' 89 Ed Bachner, Board Member
and Vice President of Technology, also warned in that same year that
if Toyobo's Zylon tests were accurate, it was "unlikely the present
Zylon designs will maintain adequate performance throughout their
warranty period." 90
Not only did certain company executives realize the danger of the
product, they were also aware of the risk of not disclosing the prod-
uct's flaws. Company executives of Second Chance wrote in a 2002
letter to the board that the company could "continue to operate as
though nothing is wrong until one of our customers is killed or
wounded or ... Dupont or some other entity exposes the Zylon prob-
lem." 91 But the "downfall" to this solution, they wrote, would be that
87. See Pennsylvania Attorney General Pappert Accuses Bulletproof Vest Maker of
Failing to Disclose Potentially Life Threatening Flaws in Equipment Sold to Penn-
sylvania Law Enforcement, PR NEWSWIRE, July 27, 2004, at State and Regional
News. Toyobo also recommended that Second Chance keep the fabric stored in a box
at the factory and not left out in the light for extended periods. Id. In a subsequent
letter dated August 2001, Toyobo informed Second Chance of the fabric's loss of
strength during exposure to heat and humidity, conditions customers wearing the vest
were likely to experience. Id. Specifically in that letter, Toyobo warned Second
Chance to "please share this information with your customers." Id. Yet according to
Attorney General Jerry Pappertto, "[t]he climate test results were not shared with po-
lice nor were law enforcement officials warned that exposure to light or excessive
heat and humidity could also weaken the vests." Id.
88. Erik Arvidson, Reilly Suing Two Companies Over Bulletproof Vests, LOWELL
SUN (Lowell, Mass.), Nov. 18, 2003, at Local (quoting Attorney General Thomas
Reilly's complaint against Second Chance and Toyobo).
89. See Scott Marshall, Officer's Widow Waits For Justice--Criminal, Civil Trials
Remain Months Away, N. COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.nctimes.
con/articles/2005/02/21/news/top-stories/22005194524.txt.
90. David Zeman & Joe Swickard, Flaws and Secrets Lead to a Fall, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Nov. 22, 2005, at lB.
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"a law enforcement officer will be killed wearing one of our vests and
we will be forced to make excuses as to why we didn't recognize and
correct the problem. In the eyes of law enforcement we will either be
stupid for not knowing, or greedy and uncaring for knowing and not
doing anything about it. ' 92
Still, not a single police department was warned of the vest's
flaws, and no recall was issued for another year, a decision Westrick
suggests may have been influenced by executive plans to make shares
of the corporate stock available for public trading. 93 A year later, in
June 2003, Officer Tony Zeppetella was shot to death while wearing
an eight-month-old Zylon vest.94
In Zeppetella v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., Tony Zep-
petella's wife brought a lawsuit against Second Chance Body Armor
and Toyobo Co. Ltd., the Japanese manufacturer of the Zylon fiber
used to make the vests, for the wrongful death of her husband. 95 She
alleged that "the companies knew for years that the strength of Zylon
fibers, used to make the vests, quickly and significantly degraded-
sometimes in only a few months-yet continued to sell the vests and
did not let law enforcement officials know of the potential dangers and
risks."196 The companies did not warn the public of these risks until
four months after Zeppetella's death. 97 After nearly a week of delib-
erations, the jury found the two companies fully liable for economic
damages and thirty percent liable for non-economic damages and de-
92. Joe Swickard & David Zeman, In the Line of Fire, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov.
28, 2005, at 1. Davis insists that his concerns regarding the vest, when raised at board
meetings, were met with resistance from and stymied by other board executives, who
voted instead to continue providing funds for vest testing. Zeman & Swickard, supra
note 90, at I B. Paul Banducci, however, a board member who later became President
and CEO of Second Chance, testified in a deposition that Davis, as President of the
company, had the final word on the issue, saying "I think Richard Davis held veto as
president." Id.
93. See Zeman & Swickard, supra note 90, at lB.
94. See Dana Littlefield, Lawsuits Mount for Maker of Protective Police Vests, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 25, 2004, at Al; Zeman & Swickard, supra note 90, at lB.
Weeks after Zeppetella's shooting and the permanent disabling of another officer who
had been wearing a Second Chance Body Armor vest, Davis resigned as President and
CEO of the company and then later left the board in 2004. Id.
95. Allison Torres Burtka, Settlement Follows Jury Verdict in Body Armor Case,
TRIAL, Jan. 1, 2007, at 74(2) (citing Zeppetella v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.,
No. GIN 034151 (Cal., San Diego Co. Super.) (settled Nov. 7, 2006)).
96. Natalie White, Calif. Superior Court Rules Bulletproof Vest Manufacturer Lia-
ble for Death of Officer, POLICE.COM, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.policeone.com/po-
lice-products/tactical/body-armor/articles/1 187179/.
97. Jose Luis Jim6nez, Trial Against Makers of Protective Vest Begins, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIfl., Aug. 11, 2006, at NC.
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manded they pay Zeppetella's wife and toddler son $2.5 million in
damages. 98
III.
CORRECTING THE ASYMMETRY OF COSTS TO BENEFITS
OF RISK-CREATING BEHAVIOR BY
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
In all of the examples discussed in Part IH, the corporate entity
was held civilly liable to its victims or was at least potentially liable.
But because no Executive-Internalization federal laws exist and only
extremely limited versions exist in some states, no criminal charges
were brought against any of the culpable executives.
Currently, business entities are civilly liable for fraudulent claims
and for selling excessively dangerous products, mostly under products
liability laws.99 This liability system, however, has not sufficiently
dissuaded many corporate executives from passing on the risks to con-
sumers because corporate executives, who are rationally interested in
maximizing personal remuneration, shift the costs (including punitive
damage awards) of risky behavior to the business entities or the con-
suming public. Payments to victims are reflected against the corpora-
tion's profits, which, all else being equal, will lower the value of the
stock to the shareholders. While corporate executives usually have
sizeable shareholdings and stock options, and are thus arguably af-
fected, this offset often does not directly result in negative incentives
to the executives responsible for the wrongdoing because the ultimate
compensation to the victims (and thus the corporation's payment) typ-
ically takes place years, or even decades, after the initial tort, well
after the executives have either realized the gains on their holdings
and options or even left their corporations.
98. Scott Marshall, Jury: Vest Makers Failed to Warn Slain OPD Officer of
Problems, N. COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Sept. 8, 2006, at Bus. & Fin. News (reporting
that jurors awarded Jamie Zeppetella and her toddler son, Jakob, $2.1 million in eco-
nomic damages and $1.5 million for the loss of love and companionship they would
suffer as a result of Tony Zeppetella's death; the Zeppetellas expected to collect only
about $2.5 million of the $3.6 million in damages the jury awarded because the jury
decided that the man on death row for shooting Zeppetella was responsible for sev-
enty percent of the non-economic damages and the Zeppetellas had previously
dropped the man from the suit because the criminal justice system was already hold-
ing him accountable.).
99. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998) § 1 ("One en-
gaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distrib-
utes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused
by the defect.").
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Since corporate executives personally realize the gains of salary
and executed stock options, but do not bear the potential liability costs
under this regime, they have no incentive to limit the latter if doing so
will negatively impact the former. This incentive/disincentive asym-
metry rationally leads corporate executives to pursue riskier than opti-
mal activities. l°° Indeed, for various reasons, some not implicating
strategic departure, corporate CEO tenure has been on the decline. 101
Regardless of the cause, the cyclical nature of executive tenure fosters
this environment of pursuing short-term individual returns at the ex-
pense of long-term corporate costs. While we would expect that
shareholder governance mechanisms would work to counteract this in-
centive for executives to exploit the business entity, these industry ex-
ecutives are the very ones with the information that would allow the
outside investors to act as a check on this executive abuse. 10 2 Due to
these informational asymmetries, the potential safeguard shareholders
may use to control management abuse is too often ineffective.
A. The Absence of Executive-Directed Disincentives in
Current American Corporate Law
The solution to industry executives' exploitation of informational
asymmetries and cost-shifting opportunities is the imposition of crimi-
nal liability directly on corporate executives responsible for the know-
ing or reckless introduction of dangerous products and services into
the marketplace, i.e., the Executive-Internalization Approach. This
100. During the hearing before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Victor
Schwartz, opponent of the Executive-Internalization Approach, admitted that he has
not evaluated the asymmetry of costs to benefits of risk-creating behavior by industry
executives because he draws no distinction between the industry executives and the
business entity itself. Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate
Accountability?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17-18
(2006) (statement of Victor Schwartz). Moreover, Schwartz stated that he "do[es]n't
see the need for any additional criminal deterrence to get the right decision[s by indus-
try executives.] That is just based upon [his] experience." Id. at 18.
101. See Be a CEO? No Way!, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 6, 2004, http://money.cnn.
comi2004/10/06/news/newsmakers/ceo-survey/index.htm (discussing a Burson-Mar-
steller survey which reports that CEO tenure has increasingly declined from ten years
in 1990, to four to six years in 2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 883 & n.58 (2002) (reporting that median CEO tenure decreased
from seven years in 1980 to five years in 2000); CEOGO.com, Quick Stats, http://
www.ceogo.com/pages/ceofacts/quickstats.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (noting av-
erage CEO tenure of 10 years in 2002 down to 6.6 years in 2003); CHUCK LUCIER,
ERIC SPIEGEL & ROB SCHUYT, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, WHY CEOs FALL: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF TURNOVER AT THE Top 7 (2002), available at http://
www.boozallen.com/media/file/1 10173.pdf.
102. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 440-41 (2007).
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will improve upon the existing scheme by incentivizing corporate ex-
ecutives to minimize the manufacturing and provision of excessively
dangerous products and services.
The Executive-Internalization Approach may appear to be a radi-
cal change to corporate law, which traditionally has sought to protect
corporate executives from personal liability via the "corporate
veil."'10 3 The legal landscape, however, has resisted a dogmatic appli-
cation of such immunity in an attempt, albeit highly inconsistent, to
balance equities. As such, corporate law already recognizes two long-
standing exceptions to the limitation on personal liability-piercing
the corporate veil and executive civil liability.' 0 4 'These two devices
must be examined to determine whether they can be used to re-orient
corporate executives' incentives before we consider adopting the Ex-
ecutive-Internalization Approach to address the present problem.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows injured parties
to seek compensation directly from corporate executives with owner-
ship interests in the company in certain circumstances. 0 5 Application
of the doctrine remains fact-specific and difficult to define generally,
but frequently begins with issues of control and fraud. '0 6 The applica-
tion of the doctrine to large publicly-held corporations, however, is
103. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 69-70 (2000) (ex-
plaining that piercing the corporate veil means suing shareholders of a corporation,
i.e. attaching liability directly to owners rather than the business entity); see also
Vermont v. Staco Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32, 835 (D. Vt. 1988) (holding CEOs
liable because of their capacity and authority to control disposal activities); Int'l
Clinical Lab. Inc. v. Stevens, No. CV 87-3472, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3685 at *9-10
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1990) (holding the president liable as an operator because he had
the overall responsibility for the management of the corporate operator); Rockwell
Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (holding a
parent company liable as an operator because the parent company participated in the
management of the subsidiary and exercised control over the subsidiary's facility).
104. For a general exposition of these corporate law topics, see GEVURTZ, supra note
103, at 69-70, 273-448 (discussing piercing the corporate veil and executive liability
for breaches of fiduciary duties).
105. See id. at 69-70; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & EcONOMICS
150 n.48, 151 (2002).
106. See id. at 151-53 (discussing the instrumentality rule for piercing the corporate
veil which requires a plaintiff to show "(1) control of the corporation by defendant
that is so complete as to amount to total domination of finances, policy, and business
practices such that the controlled corporation has no separate mind, will or existence;
(2) such control is used to commit a fraud, wrong or other violation of plaintiff's
rights; and (3) the control and breach of duty owed to the plaintiff was a proximate
cause of the injury.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d
6, 8 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966); United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. 142 F.
247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) ("[When] the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons.") (emphasis added).
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highly limited and, when viewed with the goal of holding corporate
actors personally liable-rather than parent corporations-has been so
haphazard as to make it all but a theoretical curiosity.107 Accordingly,
this doctrine cannot be used to attach personal liability to corporate
executives in publicly-held corporations for their knowing introduc-
tion of dangerous products and services into the marketplace.
The second method by which corporate executives may typically
be exposed to personal liability is through direct or derivative actions
brought against them individually rather than against their corpora-
tions for their actions in breaching their fiduciary obligations. 10 8
However, these suits typically can be initiated only by the sharehold-
ers, not third-party victims. 109 Furthermore, executives can take pre-
cautionary measures to limit their exposure. One such option is
directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance)." 0 Another
is to insert indemnification and advancement-of-expenses clauses in
their employment contracts."1  And after Smith v. Van Gorkom,1 12
statutes such as Delaware General Corporation Law § 102(b)(7) have
virtually eliminated any significant likelihood of personal liability for
corporate executives by allowing them to shift these costs back to the
107. There are almost no reported cases of veil piercing for publicly held corpora-
tions. See Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability
Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (1997). After analyzing hundreds of cases,
Professor Thompson concluded that "[p]iercing occurs only in close corporations or
corporate groups; it does not occur in publicly held corporations." Id. In an earlier
study, Thompson found that "among the 1600 reported cases of piercing the veil,
there was no case in which shareholders of a publicly held corporation were held
liable," and he further concluded that "[pliercing occurs only within corporate groups
or in close corporations with fewer than ten shareholders. None of the close corpora-
tions in which piercing occurred had more than nine shareholders." See also Robert
W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983-85 (1971) (noting that
shareholder liability is an "exceptional remedy"); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1047 (1991) (report-
ing from the author's empirical data that "[i]n the entire data set, piercing did not
occur in a publicly held corporation" and that "[t]his universal respect for the sepa-
rateness of the corporate entity in publicly held corporations reflects the different role
that limited liability plays in larger corporations").
108. See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 103, at 273-448.
109. See id. at 304-13 (explaining that directors generally do not have a legally
enforceable duty to constituencies other than the corporation, its shareholders and,
under certain limited circumstances, its creditors).
110. Id. at 447-48.
111. See id. at 437-47 (explaining that corporations may contractually agree to reim-
burse corporate officers for expenses associated with certain lawsuits against them
and may advance executives the money necessary to pay legal expenses).
112. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding directors have a duty to shareholders
"to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant to
their decision").
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corporation."13 Given the diffuse nature of shareholders, 14 their re-
sistance to corporations' assumption of director and officer liability or
the costs of D&O insurance is insignificant-all but guaranteeing that
officers and directors of publicly-held corporations will virtually never
face personal liability for direct or derivative suits.
While these rules imposing civil liability on individual executives
have largely proven ineffective, they do demonstrate that the direct
imposition of liability on corporate executives is an accepted legal the-
ory. As such, the Executive-Internalization Approach offers a viable
supplement to current law.
No discussion of options for corporate and executive liability
would be complete without analyzing all of the permutations of liabil-
ity. I have discussed civil liability for corporations (products liability
law) and the limitations that it poses. I have also discussed civil liabil-
ity for executives. Criminal corporate liability remains. While a rela-
tively new development, statutes that hold corporations criminally
liable are now generally accepted. 1 5 As a Texas court observed,
At early common law, a corporation being an artificial person and
an inanimate legal entity, was deemed incapable of committing a
crime, it could not entertain a culpable mental state and it could not
be physically punished. This incapacity no longer exists. A corpo-
ration is now capable of committing a crime and is capable of being
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) ("the certificate of incorporation may
[] contain ... [a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director: ... [except] (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law . . . or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit").
114. See e.g., John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:
How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 849 (1999)
(explaining that shareholders exercise little control over public corporations for
mainly two reasons: the problem of free-riding presents the risk of bearing all the
costs, while receiving only a portion of the benefit and the costs of communication,
coordination, and negotiation, rise in proportion to the number of shareholders);
K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting & The Bundling Problem in Corporate Law,
2004 Wis. L. REV. 1425, 1472-74 (2004) (noting that individual shareholders lack
incentive to thoroughly investigate consequences of corporate actions because bene-
fits of conducting costly research accrue to entire corporations rather than to individ-
ual contributors alone); John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capi-
tal Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 861, 884-85 (2005) (arguing that shareholders
will not monitor corporation since cost to individual outweigh benefits).
115. See, e.g., Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) ("Today, however, the general rule is that a corporation may be held liable for
criminal acts performed by its agents acting on its behalf.").
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punished therefor. [sic] The circumstances under which it is liable
are commonly described by statute.' 16
This liability, however, does nothing to address the concerns that
I have discussed, that is, that the costs of the penalties will not be
internalized by the corporate executives, particularly if those execu-
tives have left the corporations by the time the liability attaches to the
corporations. Since corporations cannot be imprisoned, only financial
and, perhaps, stigmatic sanctions remain. The former are identical to
the economic sanctions discussed regarding products liability, and the
latter are unlikely to transfer significantly to corporate executives-
should they even be with the corporation when the liability attaches.
These three doctrines still leave a gap through which executives
can largely escape full internalization for their actions. For this, I
have proposed executive criminal liability-the Executive-Internaliza-
tion Approach-in response.
B. The Executive-Internalization Approach: The Unique
Incentive Effects of Criminal Law
The most effective method to shift the costs of pursuing exces-
sively risky corporate behavior back to the corporate executives is
through the imposition of criminal sanctions on these individuals. In
contrast to civil liability discussed above, the criminal penalties of the
Executive-Internalization Approach are unique in three ways that pre-
vent corporate executives from shifting the costs of personal liability
back to the corporation.
First, individual (in contrast to corporate) criminal penalties are
non-transferable. Imprisonment is individual specific and non-fungi-
ble. Similarly, criminal fines are typically not reimbursed by business
entities and insurance policies.1 17
116. Id. at 806 n.3 (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 812 ("However it has
been said that a definition of certain forms of manslaughter may be formulated which
would be applicable to a corporation and make it liable for various acts of misfeasance
and nonfeasance when resulting in homicide. Thus, a corporation has been held sub-
ject to prosecution for involuntary manslaughter where there was nothing in the defi-
nition of the crime or the punishment provided which would make it impossible to
hold a corporation liable.") (internal citations omitted).
117. Corporate Laws Committee, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 56 Bus. LAW.
1571, 1619-21 (2001) (noting that D&O insurance typically excludes criminal penal-
ties and fines, and Model Act forbids, even with shareholder approval, inclusion of a
provision in articles of incorporation eliminating or limiting directors' personal liabil-
ity for money damages resulting from his or her intentional violation of criminal law;
corporate indemnification is permitted only when individual director has acted in
good faith and without reasonable cause to believe that his or her conduct was
unlawful).
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Second, criminal penalties, regardless of their form or nature,
carry a social stigma of moral condemnation. As such, even if the
penalty is de minimus and does not infringe personal freedom, the
sanction has a significant cost to corporate executives."i 8 Given their
personal risk adversity, corporate executives are particularly sensitive
to this sanction.1 9 As a consequence, in the corporate executive con-
text, society will have to spend less to exact corrective behavior than it
will to enforce laws designed to protect society from risk-preferring
criminals, i.e., more "traditional criminals."120
Third, these non-pecuniary costs typically translate to direct fi-
nancial costs by limiting corporate executives' future access to the
executive-labor market.' 21 As a result, even criminally convicted cor-
porate executives who are able to avoid incarceration and significant
fines will have the economic benefits of risk-taking derived from the
afore-described cost-shifting and informational asymmetries offset, if
not eliminated, by the subsequent inability to obtain similar
employment.
Some question the Executive-Internalization Approach based on
an asserted difficulty in defining a "defective" product.12 2 This cri-
tique, however, is unwarranted. Defining dangerousness has been
thoroughly litigated and analyzed in products liability law when evalu-
ating defectiveness. The standard rule is that "[b]adly conceived prod-
ucts that carry needless danger are designed defectively."' 123
The Restatement of Products Liability speaks extensively to this
issue and adopts the well-litigated risk-utility test to define design de-
118. See, e.g., Maura M. Okamoto, Recent Development: RCRA's Criminal Sanc-
tions: A Deterrent Strong Enough to Compel Compliance?, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 425,
428 & n.27 (1997).
119. An example of this phenomenon can be seen with Martha Stewart's continued
pursuit of her appeal of her conviction, notwithstanding the completion of her term of
imprisonment. See Krysten Crawford, The Fight to Clear Martha's Name,
CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 17, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2O05/O3/16/news/newsmak-
ers/martha-appeaUindex.htm.
120. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 184 (1968) (discussing the cost of deterrence and noting that some
criminals are "risk preferrers," who then require greater punishment in order to deter).
121. See Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, Go Ahead, Make the SEC's Day, Bus.
WK., June 2, 2003, at 27 (noting that during first two-thirds of 2003, SEC barred 105
fraudulent executives from ever holding another executive position in a public
company).
122. See Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate Accounta-
bility? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 181-82, 185
(2006) (statement of Victor Schwartz, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP).
123. 2 DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 980 (2001).
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fects. 124 The risk-utility test is itself a derivation from Judge Learned
Hand's test set forth in the iconic decision, United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.12 5 Under the oft-quoted Learned Hand formula, the de-
fendant is liable if the cost of preventing harm is less than the product
of the probability and the magnitude of harm. 126 This test protects
only those that undertake "all appropriate investigation," and unknown
risks are, appropriately, not held against manufacturers either.12 7
Moreover, product harm and, therefore, the determination as to
whether the product is defective, is reduced by disclosing known
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b), cmt. a (1998) (explaining
that for design defects "[s]ome sort of independent assessment of advantages and dis-
advantages, to which some attach the label 'risk-utility balancing,' is necessary" to
determine dangerousness); see also id. Reporter's Note, cmt. d.III.A at 77 ("Scholarly
commentary written prior to this Restatement project agrees overwhelmingly with the
majority view reflected in the above-cited decisions and § 2(b) and the risk-utility/
reasonable alternative design approach adopted herein.") (citing 1 MADDEN, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY 299 (2d ed. 1988)); DOBBS, supra note 123, at 985 (stating that the
Restatement adopted a risk utility test). Some states have adopted this test statutorily,
as well. See id. at 985 & n.5 (citing to statutory provisions of North Carolina and
Ohio).
125. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
126. Id. ("if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B<PL."). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. (f) at 91-92 (1998)
("The monetary cost of the alternative design may exceed the safety benefits to be
derived from it. Furthermore, an alternative design may impose significant nonmone-
tary costs on product users and consumers . ... Courts that apply a 'risk-utility'
balancing test recognize that these considerations are central to the finding that a
substitute design is a reasonable alternative . . . . This also accounts for the oft-
repeated statement that a manufacturer has no obligation to provide the safest design
available or provide for the ultimate in safety .... In sum, an alternative design is
reasonable if its marginal benefits exceed its marginal costs."); George Priest, Eco-
nomic of Civil Justice Reform Proposals, 9 KAN. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 401, 401 (2000),
available at http://www.law.ku.edu/joumal/articles/v9n3/v9n3p41.html ("Let's im-
agine we have costs [of preventing accidents] on the vertical axis .... [T]he cost
curve for almost any type of investment will increase over time as it becomes margin-
ally more costly to prevent further accidents. We would imagine, as parties are en-
couraged to make investments to prevent accidents, that accident losses would
decline. As there are greater investments to prevent accidents on this upwards sloping
curve, the number of accidents, and the magnitude of accidents that occur, is going to
decline. So the horizontal axis is both the level of preventive investments and the
number of accidents, the magnitude of accidents, weighted by the costs of the acci-
dents. If we are trying to think about this as a general social policy question, the
optimum is at the point where the marginal cost of accidents equals the marginal cost
of preventing accidents. We are never actually going to find a point like this, but it is
useful in thinking about such a point for conceptual purposes. It is at this point that we
have optimal accident prevention, in the sense that the costs of preventing further
accidents, that is, the costs beyond this optimum, are greater than the costs of the
accidents themselves.").
127. DOBBS, supra note 123, at 990-91.
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risks.' 28 This creates a positive incentive to disclose risks, allowing
consumers to make more informed and rational decisions. 129
The Restatement of Torts distinguishes between two types of
product defects: design defects and manufacturing defects. 130 The
former is inherent in the product, and is subject to the fault analysis
described above 131 while the latter is typically unintended and subject
to strict liability. 132 It is in this latter category that those opposed to
the Executive-Internalization Approach seek refuge. They suggest
that this standard is inconsistent with the precepts of criminal law that
typically require knowledge. 133 This distinction is, however, mis-
placed, as the proposal contained herein requires knowledge even in
the manufacturing defect context. Indeed, the cases discussed above
demonstrate this application.
For example, the defective Guidant defibrillator calamity demon-
strates how the Restatement's products liability standard, combined
with a universal knowledge requirement, produces equitable and en-
forceable rules. Guidant produced a defibrillator with a serious defect.
When the patient with the implanted defibrillator needed the "shock"
produced by the unit, the device occasionally short circuited, in which
case the patient typically died. 134 The first question in this situation is
whether this is a design or a manufacturing defect. If Guidant defibril-
lator occasionally short circuited regardless of an error during the
manufacturing process, then the product is easily determined to be a
design defect, because "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a rea-
sonable alternative design by the seller . . . and the omission of the
128. See id. at 996; see also Ross Labs v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986)
("The cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal ... that the balance
must always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn where there is a substantial
danger which will not be recognized by the ordinary user."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 Reporter's Note cmt. i at 95 (1998) (discussing the in-
formed-choice concept in products liability suits).
129. The Restatement further limits defective claims in medical products only to
those cases in which the foreseeable risks are so great in comparison to the benefits
that a reasonable medical provider would not provide the product to any class of
patient. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. at § 6(c).
130. Id. at § 2.
131. Id., cmt. a. at 16-17.
132. Id.; see also id., Reporters' Note cmt. a at 40.
133. See, e.g., Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate Ac-
countability? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 185 (2006)
(statement of Victor Schwartz, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP).
134. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe." 135 In this
case, the "reasonable alternative design" would be the design that
other defibrillator manufacturers were using-one without faulty wir-
ing. Under products liability law, the manufacturer is liable under
both sections 2 and 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability.' 36 Of course, it seems unreasonable to assume that Guidant
intentionally designed its defibrillator with faulty wiring.
The better analysis of the Guidant affair would be through the
prism of a manufacturing defect. 137 Under such a view, we would
assume that Guidant did not intend to produce a deadly short-circuit-
ing defibrillator, when safer designs were readily available. In other
words, we assume that in producing the properly designed product, a
defect developed. In such a circumstance, Guidant could be held lia-
ble civilly even without knowledge of the defect.1 38 This should not
be the standard for criminal culpability, and nobody who seriously
discusses these issues suggests otherwise. Criminal liability should
require knowledge of the manufacturing defect, which is exactly what
occurred in the Guidant affair. Guidant became aware of the previ-
ously latent manufacturing defect, yet continued to sell the deadly de-
vice and failed to inform future as well as past purchasers. 139 At this
point, under the Executive-Internalization Approach, the corporate ex-
ecutives would become criminally liable.
Indeed, in all of the cases discussed above, the alleged facts in-
volve corporate executives who knew or should have reasonably
known of the dangers that they imposed on consumers. These are not
cases of strict liability, which does exist in civil products liability law.
The Executive-Internalization Approach, which redefines civil prod-
ucts liability law for the criminal context, would hold industry execu-
tives personally responsible for their knowing or reckless actions.
Such legislation would require reasonable investigation of risks by in-
dustry executives, to prevent intentional ignorance, and it would offer
protection to the industry executives upon compliance. The Execu-
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LiAB. § 2(b) (1998). See also id.
§ 6(b)( 2), (c).
136. Section 2 provides the general requirements for products liability and Section 6
further refines the standard for medical products. In the latter instance, the Restate-
ment is more generous to the manufacturer because of the difficulty in eliminating
risks of danger in medical devices, which typically balance the risk of side effects
against the reward of positive health effects. See id. § 6 cmt. b at 146-47.
137. Indeed, it seems indisputable that Guidant would agree that the defect was not
part of the intended design.
138. See supra note 136, Reporters' Note cmt. a at 40-41.
139. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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tive-Internalization Approach has significant historical parallels both
nationally and internationally, which are analyzed below.
C. The Proposed Statute
A draft of the operative language for the Executive-Internaliza-
tion Approach follows:
A. It shall be unlawful for individuals to knowingly or recklessly
introduce a defective product or service into the stream of inter-
state commerce. If a defective product or service is introduced into
the stream of interstate commerce through a business entity, the
principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial
officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions of busi-
ness entities that introduce products or services into the stream of
interstate commerce, shall constitute the individuals referenced
above in this section, and criminal liability shall not attach to sub-
ordinates within the organization under this section unless they
knowingly prevent the principal executive officer or officers and the
principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing simi-
lar functions from receiving information establishing the defective-
ness of the product or service. Each violation of this section that
causes injury shall be subject to a penalty of up to ten years impris-
onment and a maximum fine of $1 million. Each violation of this
section that causes death shall be subject to a penalty of up to
twenty years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $2 million.
B. The principal executive officer or officers and the principal fi-
nancial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions
of business entities that introduce products or services into the
stream of interstate commerce shall design, maintain, and update
such internal controls to ensure that reasonable efforts are made to
determine whether any product or service being introduced into the
stream of interstate commerce is defective prior to the introduction
of the product or service into the stream of interstate commerce.
Each violation of this section shall be subject to a penalty of up to
twenty years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $2 million.
C. No business entity or any officer, employee, contractor, subcon-
tractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, sus-
pend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the employee
(i) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which
the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of the
above sections; or
(ii) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise
assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowl-
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edge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of the above
sections.
(1) Enforcement Action
(i) A person who alleges discharge or other discrimination by any
person in violation of this section may seek relief under subsection
(2) by bringing an action at law or equity in the appropriate dis-
trict court of the United States, which shall have jurisdiction over
such an action without regard to the amount in controversy.
(2) Remedies
(i) An employee prevailing in any action under subsection (C)(1)
shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.
(ii) Relief for any action under paragraph (i) shall include, but is
not limited to:
(a) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee
would have had, but for the discrimination;
(b) the amount of back pay, with interest; and
(c) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of
the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees,
and reasonable attorney fees.
(3) Savings Clause
(i) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to diminish the rights,
privileges, or remedies of any employee under any Federal or State
law, or under any collective bargaining agreement.
IV.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALIZING WRONGFUL
INDUSTRY-EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOR
A. The Domestic Model
Recent congressional action demonstrates that the federal
criminalization of wrongdoing, previously thought the exclusive prov-
ince of civil enforcement, has been effective. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) requires the chief executive and chief
financial officers of covered corporations to personally certify that Se-
curities Exchange Commission reports comply with regulatory stan-
dards. 140 The failure to do so personally exposes these senior
executives to criminal sanctions,1 41 ensuring that corporate executives
do not shift responsibility to unwitting or powerless subordinates. As
such, this statute, like the Executive-Internalization Approach, applies
criminal penalties directly to corporate executives and prevents them
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a), (b) (Supp. V [Jan. 2, 2006]).
141. Id. at § 1350(c).
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from protecting themselves through intentional ignorance and failure
to investigate, a strategy attempted by Kenneth Lay and others. 142
Following this model, the law should require businesses to elicit
and maintain organized data on serious injuries and deaths sustained
as a result of their products and services, and to share this information
with other senior executives and the public. Sarbanes-Oxley grants
legislative protection to whistle blowers by imposing separate criminal
liability on corporate executives who knowingly and intentionally re-
taliate against them. 143
Similarly, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Re-
form Act of 2004 (ACPERA) created amnesty from criminal prosecu-
tion in exchange for disclosures of criminal antitrust-law violations. 144
Under the ACPERA, if a corporate conspirator self-reports its illegal
antitrust activity to the Department of Justice and meets certain condi-
tions, this corporate conspirator may both obtain amnesty from crimi-
nal liability and avoid the exposure to treble civil damages in private
actions. 145 These approaches would encourage the distribution of
safety information, and address at least one of the causes of the exces-
sive risks to which consumers are exposed. Sarbanes-Oxley's penal-
ties are not insignificant; they permit a combination of a $1 million
fine and a ten year prison term for the knowing certification of a finan-
cial statement that does not fairly present the firm's condition, or a
maximum penalty of $5 million and twenty years in prison for the
same conduct if done willfully. 146 As President Bush declared, "If
you're a CEO and you think you can fudge the books in order to make
yourself look better, we're going to find you, we're going to arrest you
and we're going to hold you to account." 147 If personal responsibility
for corporate executives can be, and indeed has been, adopted for fi-
nancial wrongdoing, then the same approach certainly is available and
advisable for wrongs that directly result in physical injury or death.
Although the criminalization of corporate executive behavior
under Sarbanes-Oxley was novel at the federal level, criminal sanc-
142. See Anthony Bianco, Commentary: Ken Lay's Audacious Ignorance, BUSINESS-
WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_06/
b3970082.htm.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. V [Jan. 2, 2006]).
144. Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 213, 118 Stat. 661, 666 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2, 3 and 16).
145. Id. The required conditions include determining: it is the first conspirator to
confess, it is not the ringleader of the conspiracy, and it agrees to cooperate fully with
the investigation. Id. at § 213(b).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c).
147. Mike Allen, Bush Pledges More Corporate Fraud Arrests; President Highlights
Issue as Poll Shows Ratings Down, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at A10.
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tions to industry executives already exist in a very limited fashion
under state law. Many current state criminal laws expose individuals
to criminal liability for false advertising; others impose individual
criminal liability on corporate actors for corporate criminal activity,
including deceptive acts. 148 Both of these serve as a philosophical
parallel to the Executive-Internalization Approach proposed here.
These state laws, however, fail dramatically to achieve the goals
of the Executive-Internalization Approach for a variety of reasons.
First, these statutes are typically of limited applicability; as the foot-
note and more detailed appendix at the end of this article demonstrate,
these statutes tend to focus on particular acts of misrepresentation and
are punishable as misdemeanors or low level felonies. As such, even
if enforced, the incentive effect is limited by both the breadth of the
statutes and the degree of potential punishment. Second, an examina-
tion of these statues demonstrates the wide variation among them.
This variation is problematic for products sold nationally, as the pun-
ishment will vary depending on the state in which the injury occurs,
the state in which the injured party lives, or the state in which the
corporation is headquartered. Third, and most importantly, state pros-
ecutors often are not motivated to prosecute such complex, resource-
intensive cases of national dimension.' 49 Specifically, states have far
more limited budgets than the federal government; as such, federal
agencies are better able to conduct investigations and pursue prosecu-
tions than state prosecutors.150 This discrepancy is a real problem that
merits considering federal legislation on the issue.15 1
The sizeable criminal penalties of Sarbanes-Oxley caused many
to predict an exodus of corporate executives as a result of the statute's
enactment. 152 These prognostications of doom turned out to be
148. See infra Appendix.
149. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 989, 1052 (2006) (noting that states have more limited budgets than the fed-
eral government, particularly in the criminal-justice context); David L. Cook et al.,
Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts: More Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1579, 1595 (1995) (asserting that increasing federal budgets allow federal agen-
cies to conduct more investigations and pursue a greater number of prosecutions).
150. See supra note 149.
151. Senate staff attorneys have often remarked on the availability of state resources,
both statutory and financial, and considered whether a problem has a national scope in
determining if an issue should be subject to federal legislation.
152. See Michael Schroeder, Business Reform Measure Debated, ALBANY TIMES-
UNION, July 27, 2003 at D1 (noting that many predicted a shortage of board member
candidates due to Sarbanes-Oxley, but data has not supported prediction).
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false. 153 Comparable predictions offered about the current proposal
ultimately will be relegated to a similar position of obscurity.
This does not mean that legislating the Executive-Internalization
Approach will have no negative consequences. The Executive-Inter-
nalization Approach will likely increase the cost of hiring and main-
taining executives at corporations because the executives will
rationally want to be compensated for the assumption of this addi-
tional risk. This increased cost will likely result in lower profits for
public shareholders, although the size of this effect is not likely great.
As with any criminal sanction, the Executive-Internalization Ap-
proach might result in wrongful convictions that would inflict dam-
ages upon the wrongfully convicted and could remove capable
individuals from the executive market.' 54 The Executive-Internaliza-
tion Approach may indeed deter some qualified individuals from en-
tering the executive marketplace, although, as discussed above, the
magnitude of this effect also is likely to be small. The Approach will
also likely increase the costs of potentially dangerous products and
services since executives will undoubtedly try to reduce their criminal
exposure by increasing the safety of their good(s) and services, and
passing the cost on to consumers. Finally, the Executive-Internaliza-
tion Approach will certainly have administrative costs at both the cor-
porate and governmental level. But, as with any policy decision, the
costs must be balanced against the benefits. I believe that the balance
inures in favor of the Executive-Internalization Approach. Of course,
the goal of this approach is an increase in safety, and the associated
increase in cost is a predictable and an appropriate offset.
B. The International Model
The concept of imposing criminal liability directly on corporate
executives also has some precedence internationally. For example,
France, Japan, and Canada faced problems of HIV-contaminated
153. See id.; Booz Allen Hamilton, Performance-Related Departures of CEOs
Reached Record Levels in 2004, May 18, 2005, http://www.boozallen.com/publica-
tions/article/658375 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley has not heightened CEO turnover
rates in the U.S.; overall rates of turnover, dismissals, and tenure remain consistent
with pre-enactment trends); Burson-Marsteller, Who Wants to Be a CEO? (2005),
http://www.ceogo.com/documents/2005CEOCapitalBrochure.pdf (clarifying that reg-
ulations are not overriding factors in decisions to turn down CEO positions).
154. This situation is different from executives dropping out of the employment mar-
ket due to the potential risk of criminal sanctions. The criminal sanction effect, as
discussed above, seems minimal. Removal from the executive market is akin to the
specific-deterrence concept in criminal law: the individual is physically prevented
from being part of the executive-employment market because of incarceration or some
other legal prohibition.
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blood supplies during the 1980s which were similar to those occurring
in the United States.' 55 And again, while methods of purifying blood
plasma were available at the time many of these incidents occurred,
financial concerns often trumped patient safety. 56 However, in con-
trast to the United States, responsible individuals in the other countries
faced criminal charges.
1. France
In a 1992 case known as "l'affaire du sang contamin6," i.e., the
tainted blood episode, 57 six French public officials were convicted for
continuing to sell blood products from inventories that were known to
be contaminated with HIV instead of selling safer heat-treated factor
concentrates to the market. 158
Three of the convicted were executives at France's Center for
National Blood Transfusions (known by its French acronym
CNTS). 159 CNTS operates similarly to the Red Cross, although in
France CNTS is a government entity. Dr. Michel Garretta, former
Director of CNTS, ordered a regular shipment of non-heated blood
products in 1985, at a time when other countries had widely begun
purifying their blood by heating it.160 The French trial court found
Garretta was "personally aware" that the blood products distributed by
the blood transfusion service were "seriously infectious" and that he
as well as other executives were on a path to "deceive" hemophiliacs
until the un-heated blood in inventory had been completely used.161
Garretta was sentenced by the trial court to four years in prison for
"merchandising fraud" under the Act of August 1, 1905 and section
L675 of the Public Health Code and was fined five hundred thousand
155. See generally Eric Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation
in Japan, France, & The United States, 34 LAW & Soc'y REV. 651 (2000). See also,
supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the U.S. crisis.
156. See discussion, supra Part II.A.1.
157. Feldman, supra note 155, at 651; KREVER, supra note 15, at 810. See also Rod
Usher, The Stain That Won't Go Away, TIME, Mar. 8, 1999, at 25, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,21165,00.html ("[I]n the mid-1980's
some 4,400 [French] citizens were given HIV-infected blood, among them babies,
patients after surgery, and almost 1,350 hemophiliacs. About 40% of them, including
625 hemophiliacs, have died.").
158. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, October 23, 1992, D. 1993, 222 (Fr.). See Feldman, supra note 155, at 651-52;
KREVER, supra note 15, at 810-11, 833-36.
159. See Feldman, supra note 155, at 652.
160. See Editorial, Murder by Bureaucracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1992, at Al. See
also KREVER, supra note 15, at 820-21 (discussing Garretta's strategy to use up all
non-heat treated products before introducing heat treated factor concentrate).
161. See KREVER, supra note 15, at 833.
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French francs.' 62 Former Scientific Director of CNTS Dr. Jean-Pierre
Allain was charged with merchandising fraud and served two years for
knowingly allowing infected blood products to be administered to pa-
tients, 163 and former Director General of Health Professor Jacques
Roux was convicted under article 63 of the French Penal Code for
"failure to assist a person in danger" and served a suspended sentence
of three years. 164
The other three to be charged were political figures. Article 68-1
of the French Constitution allows criminal liability to be imposed on
government officials for acts committed in the exercise of their du-
ties,165 and former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, former Minister of
Social Affairs Georgina Dufoix, and former Minister of Health Ed-
mond Herv6 were charged with involuntary manslaughter and invol-
untary bodily injury for being "accessories to poisoning" by failing to
remove batches of contaminated blood in circulation even though safe
products had become available.1 66 Fabius and Dufoix were acquitted,
and Herv6 was convicted on a minor charge and not sentenced. 67
2. Japan
Japan's own HIV blood crisis during the 1970s and 1980s re-
sulted in 1,432 hemophiliacs and other patients contracting the virus
162. See Feldman, supra note 155, at 689-90; Anne-Marie Savard & Caroline
Simard, Analyse comparative de deux systkmes d'enquites publiques: l'affaire du
sang contamin [Comparative Analysis of Two Systems of Public Investigations: The
Tainted Blood Episode], 28 REVUE DE DROIT UNIVERSITE DE SHERBROOKE
[R.D.U.S.] 151, 190 (1997) (Can.-Fr.); KREVER, supra note 15, at 810.
163. See Feldman, supra note 155, at 689; KREVER, supra note 15, at 810, 835;
Scandal of Aids Transfusions Puts Ex-Ministers in the Dock, INDEPENDENT (London),
Feb. 9, 1999, at 11.
164. See Feldman, supra note 155, at 689; KREVER, supra note 15, at 810, 834-35.
Dr. Netter, director of the National Laboratory of Health, was similarly charged but
was acquitted because of his efforts to alert his superiors. Id. at 835.
165. CONST. OF 4 OCT. 1958 art. 68-1 (Fr.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FRANCE 20 (Gisbert H. Flanz, ed., 2003).
166. See Fabius On Aids Blood Charge, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 1, 1994;
KREVER, supra note 15, at 837. See also Michael E. Tigar, French Officials Now
Face New Crime Charges, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1998, at A20 (discussing charges
against Fabius, Dufoix & Herv6 and explaining that involuntary homicide-causing
death by "imprudence, inattention, negligence, or failure to observe a safety or cau-
tionary requirement imposed by law or regulation"-warrants a maximum sentence of
five years when there is evidence of deliberate failure to observe a regulation; other-
wise, the maximum sentence is three years; involuntarily causing incapacity warrants
a one-year maximum sentence).
167. See Peter D. Weinberg, et al., Legal, Financial, and Public Health Conse-
quences of HIV Contamination of Blood and Blood Products in the 1980s and 1990s,
136 ANNALS OF INT'L MED. 312, 312 (2002), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/
reprint/136/4/312.pdf.
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from untreated blood products.' 6 8 Four months after the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration certified heat treatment for making blood
products safe from HIV, Japanese officials advised clinics and hospi-
tals to stop using unheated blood. 169 One week later, however, the
ministry reversed this decision, despite knowing that unheated prod-
ucts carried the risk of HIV contamination.170
Dr. Takeshi Abe, a former top blood-policy advisor in Japan, was
criminally charged with professional negligence 71 for allegedly ig-
noring scientific evidence of blood contamination when creating
Teikyo University Hospital's blood policy.172 Criminal charges were
also filed against Akihito Matsumura, a former senior health ministry
official, who was sentenced to a suspended prison term for both know-
ingly administering untreated blood products after the ministry had
authorized safer, heat-treated blood and failing to warn the pharma-
ceutical industry and doctors of the risks of using unheated blood
products. 173 Finally, Green Cross 174 executives Renzo Matsushita,
Tadakazu Suyama, and Takehiko Kawano were charged with profes-
sional negligence for selling unheated blood products even though
they were informed of the risk of HIV contamination. 175 The three
168. Ex-Health Official Appeals Ruling Over AIDS Death, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 9, 2001, at Int'l News. See also Edith Hill Updike, Anatomy of a Tragedy, Bus.
WK., Mar. 11, 1996, at 44 (reporting that according to internal memos from records of
Atsuaki Gungi, former head of Japanese ministry's Biological and Antibiotics Divi-
sion, the ministry's recommendation to allow emergency imports of heat-treated
blood was overturned due to concern imports would "deal a blow" to domestic
companies).
169. Todd Crowell & Murakami Mutsuko, A Case of Delayed Justice: The Health
Minister Admits to a Government Cover-Up Over HIV-Tainted Blood, ASIAWEEK,
Mar. 4, 1996, at The Nations: Japan.
170. Id.
171. Article 211 of the Japanese Penal Code defines professional negligence: "A
person who fails to take necessary precautions in the conduct of business and thereby
causes death or injury to another shall be punished with penal servitude or imprison-
ment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than five hundred thousand
yen." KEIHO, art. 211, para 1, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 2402 (2005).
172. See KREVER, supra note 15, at 891; Feldman, supra note 155, at 683. See also
Hemophilia Expert Abe Dies at 88 After Acquittal in AIDS Death, JAPAN ECON. NEW-
SWIRE, Apr. 27, 2005, at Int'l News (reporting that Abe was acquitted at trial and
prosecutors appealed to the Tokyo High Court but the appeal was dismissed after
Abe's death in 2005).
173. See Ex-Health Official Appeals Ruling Over AIDS Death, supra note 168.
174. In 1980, Green Cross was Japan's largest importer and distributor of blood
products. Feldman, supra note 155, at 677-78.
175. See KREVER, supra note 15, at 891; Japan-AIDS: Japanese Drug Company
Chiefs Jailed For HIV-Contaminated Blood Scandal, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb.
24, 2000, http://www.aegis.com/news/afp/2000/AF000225.html. Judge Mikio
Miyoshi, who presided over their case, said, "The accused were well aware of the risk
of the blood products in January 1986 when (safer) heated products were put on the
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executives continued to sell unheated blood products even after they
had approved the sale of heated blood products in January 1986.176
The courts required them to issue public apologies,1 77 and sentenced
them in February 2000 to between sixteen and twenty-four months in
prison. 178
3. Canada
In the 1980s and early 1990s, after receiving injections of con-
taminated blood products, more than one thousand Canadians became
infected with HIV and twenty thousand more contracted hepatitis
C.179 Despite the United States Center for Disease Control's recom-
mendation that plasma should be heated to sixty-eight degrees Celsius
for seventy-two hours in order to effectively kill HIV, and after U.S.
and British health officials' growing concern that the products were
responsible for spreading HIV among its users forced the company to
withdraw these products from both the U.S. and the U.K. markets, 80
the U.S.-based Armour Pharmaceutical Company (Armour) exported
blood products to Canada that had been heated to only sixty degrees
Celsius for only thirty hours. 181 Canadian officials briefly suspended
market .... However, they neglected their responsibility to immediately halt sales of
the unheated products and recall the lots that had already been sold by them." Id.
176. See Kozo Mizoguchi, Japan: Convictions in Blood Scandal, CBS NEWS, Feb.
24, 2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/O2/24/world/main164402.shtml.
177. See Feldman, supra note 155, at 683. Government officials also offered public
apologies. See KREVER, supra note 15, at 890. In 1995 the former Minister of Health
issued an apology to the victims of the contaminated blood products saying, "We
would like to sincerely apologize to the families of those who have died and those still
fighting the disease. We cannot deny that delayed government measures led to the
tragic increase of victims." Id. Then in 1996, the new Minister of Health, Naoto Kan,
also issued an apology to those who had been infected, saying "On behalf of the
Ministry of Health and Welfare ... I apologize from the bottom of my heart for the
heavy damage inflicted on many innocent people." Id. Kan announced that he would
take a 20 percent reduced salary for two months as a gesture of remorse for the actions
of Ministry officials. Id.
178. Feldman, supra note 155, at 683; see also Joe Lamar, Drug Company Bosses
Jailed for Selling HIV Infected Products, BMJ, Mar. 4, 2000, http://www.bmj.com/
cgi/content/extract/32O/7235/601 (reporting that Matsushita received a 2 year sen-
tence, Suyama received an 18 month sentence and Kawano received 16 months).
179. Tracy Huffman & Harold Levy, They Knew Blood Was Tainted: Crown; All
Charges Will Be Pursued Against Company, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario), Feb.
22, 2006, at A9.
180. See Ian McDougall, 'Knew It Was Not Safe'; Crown Outlines Case Against
Doctors as Criminal Trial in Tainted Blood Scandal Begins, TORONTO SUN, Feb. 22,
2006, at 8 (noting that Armour withdrew the product in Britain and Canadian officials
wondered if they should do the same); Canada at a Glance: Emotion-Laden Trial
Begins, RES. NEws INT'L, April 21, 2006.
181. See KREVER, supra note 15, at xxvii (stating that Armour withdrew its factor
VIII concentrates that were heated to only sixty degrees Celsius (dry-heated) from the
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the distribution of Armour blood products within Canada but ulti-
mately allowed the products to be sold.18 2
Dr. Robert Perrault, a former Canadian Red Cross director, Dr.
Donald Wark Boucher, former Chief of the Blood Products Division
at the Bureau of Biologics (a regulatory body), Dr. John Furesz, for-
mer Director of the Bureau of Biologics Michael Rodell, former Ar-
mour vice president, and Armour itself are all currently being charged
with "criminal negligence causing bodily harm" under § 221 of the
Criminal Code of Canada. 183 They were specifically charged with
"permit[ting] or caus[ing] to be distributed Armour H.T. Factorate in-
fected with [HIV]" and one count of "common nuisance by endanger-
ing the public" under § 180 of the Criminal Code of Canada for
"distributing or failing to take sufficient measures to prevent the distri-
bution or infusion of Armour H.T. Factorate, and ... thereby endan-
ger[ing], through exposure to the risk of [HIV] infection, the lives,
safety or health of the public."1 84
We can conclude from these international examples that it is far
from beyond the realm of legal possibility to impose liability directly
on corporate executives who knowingly introduce dangerous products
and services in the marketplace. Although these individuals were gov-
ernment officials, their posts involved organizations similar in func-
tion and operation to private companies. It appears that the United
States lags behind other countries in its commitment to employ crimi-
nal law to assure corporate responsibility for the health and safety of
its citizens. When the well-being of our citizens is at stake, we should




Manufacturers and service providers affect the health, safety, and
lives of Americans every day-almost always in positive ways. But
at times, some business entities produce goods and services that are
excessively dangerous. Unfortunately, our current system of tort law
does not adequately incentivize industry executives to avoid this sub-
U.K. in October, 1986); McDougall, supra note 180, (reporting that shipments into
Canada continued into 1987).
182. See id.
183. See Tanya Talaga, Four Doctors Charged in Tainted-Blood Scandal, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 21, 2002, at Al; R. v. Armour Pharm. Co., No. P51/04, 205 C.C.C. (3d)
97, 101 (O.S.C.J. Jan. 17, 2006), available at 2006 C.C.C. LEXIS 17, *10-11.
184. See id. at 101-02, 2006 C.C.C. LEXIS at *10-11; HIV Tainted Blood Victims
Testifying, BROCKVILLE RECORDER & TIMES (Ontario), Apr. 21, 2006, at A5.
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optimal outcome. While private tort causes of action offer the possi-
bility of compensation to the improperly injured or to the estates of the
wrongfully killed, they are ineffective in motivating corporate execu-
tives to take proper precautionary measures because such executives
can simply shift the costs of risky behavior to the business entities or
consuming public. Since corporate executives personally realize the
gains of their compensation packages brought by sales of these exces-
sively dangerous products, but do not bear the potential liability for
this risky behavior, they have no incentive to limit the latter if doing
so will negatively impact the former.
The Executive-Internalization Approach is the most effective
method to shift the costs of pursuing excessively risky corporate be-
havior back to the corporate executives for their knowing creation of
excessive dangers that cause injuries or deaths. The incentive effects
of the Executive-Internalization Approach are unique in three ways
that prevent corporate executives from shifting the costs of personal
liability back to the corporation. Individual (in contrast to corporate)
criminal penalties are non-transferable. Criminal penalties, regardless
of their form or nature, carry a social stigma of moral condemnation.
And these non-pecuniary costs typically translate to direct financial
costs by limiting corporate executives' future access to the executive-
labor market.
The Executive-Internalization Approach will undoubtedly have
costs. But the costs serve a fundamental purpose: closing the loop-
hole that allows corporate executives to retain the gains of their risk-
taking while forcing the consumer to bear the brunt of these dangers.
I believe that the balance favors adopting the Executive-Internaliza-
tion Approach. The Executive-Internalization Approach can both in-
crease safety and impose liability on culpable parties. As a result,
lives will be saved, and individual executives will be held responsible
for their wrongful behavior.
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APPENDIX
Examples of State Corporate Criminal Liability Statutes:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-101(3)(A) (2006) ("'Deception' means:
(i) [c]reating or reinforcing a false impression, including a false im-
pression of fact, law, value, or intention or other state of mind that the
executive does not believe to be true; (ii) [p]reventing another person
from acquiring information that would affect his or her judgment of a
transaction; (iii) [flailing to correct a false impression that the execu-
tive knows to be false and that the executive created or reinforced or
that the executive knows to be influencing another person to whom the
executive stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-515 (b), (d)(1), (2) (2006) ("No person,
firm, corporation, group, or association, with intent to sell or in any-
wise dispose of... merchandise . service, or anything offered by
that person, firm, corporation, or with intent to increase the consump-
tion thereof or to induce the public in any manner to enter into any
obligation relating thereto or to acquire title thereto or an interest
therein, shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the
public or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, dissemi-
nated, circulated, or placed before the public in this state... in any...
way.... which advertisement contains any assertion, representation,
or statement of fact that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading.... Any
person . . . violating any provision of this section is guilty of an un-
classified misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a
fine ... or be imprisoned. Each sale, advertisement, or representation
in contravention of a provision of this section is deemed a distinct
offense.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-11 (2006) ("A person shall be crimi-
nally liable for conduct constituting an offense which such person per-
forms or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a
corporation.., to the same extent as if such conduct were performed
in such person's own name or behalf. ");
FLA. STAT. § 817.40(5) (2006) ("The phrase 'misleading adver-
tising' includes any statements made, or disseminated, in oral, written,
or printed form or otherwise, to or before the public, or any portion
thereof, which are known, or through the exercise of reasonable care
or investigation could or might have been ascertained, to be untrue or
misleading, and which are or were so made or disseminated with the
intent or purpose, either directly or indirectly, of selling or disposing
of real or personal property, services of any nature whatever, profes-
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sional or otherwise, or to induce the public to enter into any obligation
relating to such property or services.");
FLA. STAT. § 817.41(1) (2006) ("It shall be [a misdemeanor], for
any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or dissemi-
nated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any
misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of mislead-
ing advertising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent
and unlawful, designed and intended for obtaining money or property
under false pretenses.");
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-50(a)(2) (b).(2006) ("A person commits
the offense of using a deceptive business practice when in the regular
course of business he knowingly... [s]ells, offers, or exposes for sale
or delivers less than the represented quality . . . of any commodity
.... Any person who commits the offense . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.");
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-228 (LexisNexis 2006) ("A person
is legally accountable for any conduct the person performs or causes
to be performed in the name of a corporation ... or in its behalf to the
same extent as if it were performed in the person's own name or be-
half. Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or
an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or the un-
incorporated association having primary responsibility for the dis-
charge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to
perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were im-
posed by law directly upon the agent. When a person is convicted of
an offense by reason of the person's legal accountability for the con-
duct of a corporation .... the person is subject to the sentence author-
ized by law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the
grade and class involved.");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1909 (2006) ("Every director of a corpo-
ration.., who is present at a meeting of the directors at which any act,
proceeding or omission of such directors in violation of this chapter
occurs, is deemed to have concurred therein, unless he at the time
causes, or in writing requires, his dissent therefrom to be entered in
the minutes of the directors.");
§ 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 602/5-110 (2006) ("It is unlawful
for any person, in connection with the offer or sale of any business
opportunity in this State, to publish, circulate or use any advertising
which contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading.");
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§ 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 602/5-115 (2006) ("Any person
who willfully violates [ ] ... § 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 602/5-110
... knowing that the statement was false or misleading in any material
respect is guilty of a Class 3 felony for each offense. Each of the acts
specified shall constitute a separate offense.");
IOWA CODE § 714.16(2)(a) (2005) ("It is deceptive advertising
within the meaning of this section for a person to represent in connec-
tion with the lease, sale, or advertisement of any merchandise that the
advertised merchandise has certain performance characteristics, acces-
sories, uses, or benefits ... if, at the time of the representation, no
reasonable basis for the claim existed.");
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 61 (2005) ("An individual who
performs criminal acts, or causes such acts to be performed, in the
name of or on behalf of a corporation is legally responsible to the
same extent as if such acts were in his own name or on his own behalf.
If a criminal statute imposes a duty to act on an organization, any
agent of the organization having primary responsibility for the dis-
charge of the duty is criminally liable if he recklessly omits to perform
the required act, and he shall be sentenced as if the duty were imposed
by law directly on him.");-
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (2006) ("Unfair or decep-
tive trade practices include any (1) [flalse, falsely disparaging, or mis-
leading oral or written statement, visual description, or other
representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect
of deceiving or misleading consumers; (2) [rlepresentation that (i)
consumer goods .. or services have a sponsorship, approval, acces-
sory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity which they do
not have; (ii) a merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status, affilia-
tion, or connection which he does not have; ... (iv) consumer goods
...or services are of a particular standard, quality, [or] grade .. .
which they are not; (3) [flailure to state a material fact if the failure
deceives or tends to deceive;... (9) [d]eception, fraud, false pretense,
false premise, misrepresentation, or knowing concealment, suppres-
sion, or omission of any material fact with the intent that a consumer
rely on the same in connection with (i) [t]he promotion or sale of any
consumer good, consumer . . or service.");
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-2902(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2006)
("For the purpose of. . . selling, or disposing of property or a service,
a person may not advertise a statement containing a representation of
fact that the person knows, or by the exercise or reasonable care
should know, to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading. . . A person
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who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction
is subject to imprisonment .. or a fine . . or both.");
Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.020 (2006) ("The act, use or employment
by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or
misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or
omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertise-
ment of any merchandise in trade or commerce... is declared to be an
unlawful practice. Any person who willfully and knowingly engages
in any act, use, employment or practice declared to be unlawful in this
section with the intent to defraud shall be guilty of a class D felony.");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-317(1)(b), (2) (2005) ("A person com-
mits the offense of deceptive practices when the person purposely or
knowingly ... makes or directs another to make a false or deceptive
statement addressed to the public or any person for the purpose of
promoting or procuring the sale of property or services. If . . . the
value of any property, labor, or services obtained exceeds $1,000, the
offender shall be fined not to exceed $50,000 or be imprisoned in the
state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years, or both.");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-C:13(I)(j)(VII) (2006) ("Any per-
son convicted of [engaging in false or misleading advertising] shall be
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:6(I)(d)-(e) (2006) ("A person is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, in the course of business, he...
(d) [s]ells, offers or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled com-
modities. "Adulterated" means varying from the standard of composi-
tion or quality prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing
criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established commercial
usage. "Mislabeled" means varying from the standard of truth or dis-
closure in labeling prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing
criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established commercial
usage; or (e) [m]akes a false or misleading statement in any advertise-
ment addressed to the public or to a substantial segment thereof for the
purpose of promoting the purchase or sale of property or services.");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-15(A)(2) (2006) ("It is a fourth degree
felony for any person to ... (2) engage in unfair trade practices, inac-
curate or deceptive advertising, bait and switch selling, product mis-
representation ... of meat, livestock products or poultry products.");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-5-6 (2006) ("Any officer, agent or em-
ployee of any firm or corporation, or any other person who knowingly
authorizes or assists in the publication, advertising, distribution or cir-
culation of any false statement or representation concerning any subdi-
vided land offered for sale or lease, and any person, firm or
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corporation who, with knowledge that any written statement relating
to the subdivided land is false or fraudulent, issues, circulates, pub-
lishes or distributes it in this state, is guilty of a felony and shall be
[punished] by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine
of not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), or both.");
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20 (False advertising) (2006) ("A person
is guilty of false advertising when, with intent to promote the sale or
to increase the consumption of property or services, he makes or
causes to be made a false or misleading statement in any advertise-
ment." Under the predecessor statute, in fact, knowledge of the adver-
tisement's falsity was not required; thus, the statute imposed strict
criminal liability without even an intent requirement.
William Donnino, Practice Commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 190.20 (1999);
People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 51 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1943);
People v. Glubo, 158 N.E.2d 699, 704, 706 (1959);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 392-b (Consol. 2006) ("A person, who with
intent to defraud ... (2) [slells or offers for sale an article, which to
his knowledge is falsely described or indicated upon any such package
... or label ... is guilty of a misdemeanor.");
N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 399 (2006) ("On each package of cigarettes
sold . . . there shall be printed thereon . . . a warning of the conse-
quences of excessive smoking .... Any person, firm, corporation or
association or its officers or agents who or which violate any of the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.");
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.23(c) (2006) ("If an individual is
convicted of conduct constituting an offense performed in the name of
or on behalf of a corporation or association, he is subject to the sen-
tence authorized by law for an individual convicted of the offense.").
But see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A)(1) (2006) ("A
corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party ... to
any [criminal] action, suit or proceeding ... by reason of the fact that
he is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation
... if he acted in good faith and.., with respect to any criminal action
or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful.");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-452 (2005) ("[A]n individual made a
party to a proceeding because he is or was a director may be indemni-
fied against liability incurred in the proceeding if (a) he conducted
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himself in good faith; . . [or] (c) in the case of any criminal proceed-
ing, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful.").
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